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ABSTRACT
Does copyright violate the First Amendment? Professor Melville Nimmer asked this question forty
years ago, and then answered it by concluding that copyright itself is affirmatively speech protective.
Despite ample reason to doubt Nimmer’s response, the Supreme Court has avoided an independent,
thoughtful, plenary review of the question. Copyright has come to enjoy an all-but-categorical
immunity to First Amendment constraints. Now, however, the Court faces a new challenge to its
back-of-the-hand treatment of this vital conflict. In Golan v. Holder the Tenth Circuit considered
legislation (enacted pursuant to the Berne Convention and TRIPS) “restoring” copyright protection
to millions of foreign works previously thought to belong to the public domain. The Tenth Circuit
upheld the legislation, but not without noting that it appeared to raise important First Amendment
concerns. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. This article addresses the issues in the Golan
case, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Court. This article first considers the Copyright
and Treaty Clauses, and then addresses the relationship between copyright and the First
Amendment. The discussion endorses an understanding of that relationship in which the
Amendment is newly seen as paramount, and copyright is newly seen in the image of the
Amendment.
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GOLAN V. HOLDER: COPYRIGHT IN THE IMAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
DAVID L. LANGE, RISA J. WEAVER & SHIVEH ROXANA REED*
INTRODUCTION
Upon enacting the Bill of Rights, our Founders guaranteed that the federal
government would make no law abridging the freedom of speech; yet, Congress
routinely enacts laws that do exactly that, ostensibly in the name of some more
worthy goal. In particular, the United States copyright laws are, quite simply,
government-sanctioned abridgements of speech. While the courts have consistently
declined to view copyright law in this light, the fact remains that our freedom of
expression is severely constrained by the monopolies granted by the government to
individuals and institutions in the form of copyrights. The stated purpose of
copyright (and patents) is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”1
Progress is achieved when the public benefits from the creativity of others, by
building on what has come before to further create. Progress is achieved when a
group of student musicians spends months practicing a complicated symphony
composed by Dmitri Shostakovich and performs that symphony for family and
classmates, each member of the orchestra contributing his own expressive qualities
to the notes written by a Russian composer they never met. Is progress achieved
when Congress suddenly tells those musicians that the symphony previously made
freely available to them through the public domain is no longer available because it
has decided to “restore” Mr. Shostakovich’s copyright?2
* © David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed 2011. David L. Lange is the Melvin
G. Shimm Professor of Law at the Duke University School of Law, where he has been a member of
the faculty for more than forty years. Risa J. Weaver graduated cum laude from Duke University
School of Law in 2010. She also holds a bachelor of arts degree in European history from Case
Western Reserve University. She is a member of the State Bar of California and currently works for
the University of California, Los Angeles. She would like to thank her coauthors for their
camaraderie and friendship. The opinions stated in this article belong solely to the authors and
should not be attributed to the University of California. Shiveh Roxana Reed is a third-year law
student at Duke University School of Law, where she is the Senior Notes Editor of the Duke Law
Journal. She holds a bachelor of arts degree in French and history with honors from Wellesley
College. She would like to thank her coauthors for their engaging discussions and debates
throughout the writing process.

This essay may be freely reused under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
United States license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/. Attribution
must include the recommended citation and indicate that the Article was
originally published in The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law.
Cite as David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder:
Copyright
in
the
Image
of
the
First
Amendment,
11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 83 (2011).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
A copyright, one might add, that Mr. Shostakovich never, in fact, possessed because the
United States did not have copyright relations with the Soviet Union at the time of the symphony’s
composition. How can one restore what never existed? See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1095
1
2
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The statute that allows Congress to effect this restoration is section 104A of the
Copyright Act of 1976, which was added after the United States signed the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in
1994.3 Section 104A restores copyright protection to works by foreign authors who
previously lost (or never had) U.S. copyright protection for their works because they
did not comply with United States formalities, such as notice and deposit, or because
we had no copyright relations with their home countries at the time their work was
created.4 Restoration of copyright is available only for works that are still under
copyright in the author’s country of origin.5
Restoring copyright protection
essentially removes a work from the public domain—what once was free for all to use
now requires license fees that can be well beyond the financial means of individuals
and organizations that have previously made use of the works.6
I. BACKGROUND
Understanding why United States copyright law now contains a provision
allowing for the restoration of copyright requires a brief foray into the area of world
trade and globalization. After World War II, many of the world’s nations formed the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) in order to promote free trade by
removing protectionist barriers, such as tariffs and quotas.7
The GATT is
periodically revised at negotiating sessions known as “rounds” named for the location
where they are held.8 The Uruguay Round met from 1986 until 1994, out of which
emerged the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the TRIPS Agreement, the first
worldwide trade agreement covering intellectual property rights (“IPRs”), including
copyright.9
In addition to prescribing its own rules for IPRs, TRIPS incorporates certain
provisions of earlier multilateral IP treaties, most importantly for our purposes,
Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”).10 The Berne Convention came into being in
1886 with nine original members, including the colonial powers of the day, France,
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011); U.S. Supreme Court Will Review
Constitutionality of Restoring Copyrights in Foreign Works: Court Grants Cert in Stanford Law
School Fair Use Project Case Golan v. Holder, STAN. L. SCH. NEWS CENTER (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/news/pr/135.
3 Golan, 609 F.3d at 1080.
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A(a), 104A(h)(6)(C) (2006).
5 Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B).
6 Golan, 609 F.3d at 1082.
7 See Loretta F. Smith, The GATT and International Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 919, 919, 924–25
(1991).
8 See id. at 942.
9 The final agreement of the Uruguay Round was signed on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh,
Morocco and is entitled Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. TRIPS
is Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-TRIPS.pdf.
10 TRIPS supra note 9, at art. 9. Only Article 6bis, having to do with moral rights, is exempted
from incorporation.
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Spain, and Great Britain; membership today includes more than 150 countries.11
Notably absent from the Convention for many years was the United States, which
did not accede until 1989, when negotiations were already underway to create the
WTO and TRIPS.12
The fundamental difficulty in achieving worldwide harmony in copyright law is
that civil law countries (such as France and most of Continental Europe) and
common law countries (such as Great Britain and the United States) have
dramatically different justifications for copyright. The civil law countries view
copyright as a “natural” right residing in the author, who invests the work with his
personality.13 This view favors very strong protections with few exceptions—authors
are inherently “entitled” to control their creations.14 Common law countries, on the
other hand, view copyright as an economic bargain—the temporary monopoly is
granted to the creator as an incentive for creation and to compensate him for his
investment of time and money before the work is ultimately dedicated to the public.15
This view endorses narrow protection with broader exceptions to protect the “public
good.”16 Our constitutional requirement that copyright be for “limited times,” along
with fair use exceptions and First Amendment protection, is intended to ensure that
private creators’ rights do not deprive the public of its rights.17
To this end, the Berne Convention is not a self-executing treaty in the United
States—its provisions are only enforceable to the extent that Congress explicitly
implements them through domestic law.18 Congress passed the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 (“BCIA”) to amend the United States Copyright Act as
necessary to comport with the Berne Convention.19 Notably, section 12 of the BCIA
explicitly declined to extend “copyright protection for any work that is in the public
11 Natalie Wargo, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 403, 403 n.5 (1990).
12 Id. Indeed, Congress had begun the process of bringing U.S. copyright law into compliance
with the Berne Convention much earlier, during the drafting of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.
Under the 1909 Act, which the 1976 Act replaced, authors were awarded an initial copyright term of
twenty-eight years and had to actively renew their copyright in order to secure a second twentyeight-year term. The 1976 Act eliminated the renewal requirement and instituted a new term of
fifty years post mortem auctoris (fifty years after the death of the author, or “life-plus-fifty” as it is
commonly phrased), both of which changes comported with the Berne Convention, despite the fact
that the U.S. had not formally acceded to the Berne Convention at that point. R. Anthony Reese, Is
the Public Domain Permanent?: Congress’s Power to Grant Exclusive Rights in Unpublished Public
Domain Works, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 531, 541 (2007). The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998 extended the term again to life-plus-seventy years in order to harmonize our term with
that of the European Union, although the Berne Convention’s minimum standard remains life-plus50.
13 MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
ed., 3d ed. 1999) (1989).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 6.
16 Lior Zemer, Copyright Departures: The Fall of the Last Imperial Copyright Dominion and
the Case of Fair Use, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051, 1051–71 (2011).
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); LEAFFER, supra note 13, at 18.
18 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
[hereinafter BCIA].
19 Id.
Along with the change in term, supra note 12, other formalities, including the
requirement that all copies have affixed copyright notices, were eliminated, along with other
substantive changes.
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domain in the United States,”20 a condition that was arguably required by the Berne
Convention.21
Article 18(1) of the Berne Convention states, “[t]his Convention shall apply to all
works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the
public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.”22
As previously mentioned, this Article was incorporated into TRIPS, which the United
States signed at inception, on April 15, 1994. In order to implement the Marrakesh
Agreement and TRIPS, President Clinton signed the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (“URAA”) on December 8, 1994 (with an effective date of January 1, 1995).23
Section 514 of the URAA is titled “Restored Works” and amends the United States
Copyright Act to add section 104A, “Copyright in Restored Works.”24
In sum, section 514/section 104A requires copyright to be restored in any foreign
works that are in the public domain in the United States for reasons other than
expiry of term.25 The three most common reasons for foreign works to have fallen
into our public domain are, (1) failure to comply with formalities when they were still
required (such as affixing copyright notice to all copies or registering for renewal of
copyright term); (2) lack of copyright relations with the foreign author’s country of
residence at the time of publication; and (3) lack of protection under U.S. law for the
particular medium (e.g., sound recordings prior to 1972).26 Works whose copyrights
are restored under section 514 gain a term of protection equal to what it would have
been if the work had been properly protected initially.27 Upon either filing with the
United States Copyright Office a Notice of Intent to Enforce a Restored Copyright or
directly notifying a user of a work that the copyright has been restored,28 a foreign
BCIA, supra note 18, § 12.
37 C.F.R. § 201–02 (2005); see Copyright Office, Rules and Regulations Library of Congress,
60 FED. REG. 50414 (Sept. 25, 1995) (“The United States arguably failed to conform its law fully to
the Berne Convention in 1989 when it declined to interpret Article 18(1) on restoration as being
mandatory.”).
22 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 18(1) (Sept. 9, 1886)
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
23 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter
URAA]. The URAA was neither negotiated nor passed in typical fashion; Congress played no part in
writing the bill—it was handled entirely by the Executive Branch and the U.S. Trade
Representative—and Congress was only permitted to vote “yes” or “no” without imposing any
changes. Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States Copyright
Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J. LAW & ARTS, 157, 173, 185–86, 231 (1996);
see also David Nimmer, David Nimmer on the Constitutionality of Anti-Bootlegging legislation, 2008
EMERGING ISSUES 1131 (Nov. 27, 2007) (noting that the URAA “broke new ground” with an “eerie
abdication of oversight”).
24 URAA, supra note 23, § 514.
25 Id. (noting that section 514(h)(3) defines “eligible country” to be any country “other than the
United States” that is a member of the WTO or the Berne Convention or the subject of a presidential
proclamation to that effect).
26 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9A.04 (2011)
[hereinafter NIMMER].
27 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2006); see generally NIMMER, supra note 26, § 9A.02 (providing a
variety of examples relating to the duration of a work’s restored protection based on when it was
originally published and which U.S. copyright law was in effect at that time).
28 Arguably, this is a formality in contravention of the Berne Convention. However, in its
regulations governing such filings, the United States Copyright Office stated, “[w]e believe that such
a filing is not inconsistent with the Berne Convention because Article 18(3) of the Berne Convention
20
21
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copyright owner may seek remedies for copyright infringement as described in
Chapter 5 of the Copyright Act of 1976.29
Section 514 makes some allowances for “reliance parties,” those who relied on
the work’s public domain status in using the work directly (such as publishing copies
of the original) or in creating a derivative work.30 If a reliance party continues to
make use of the work beyond the twelfth month after the owner files the Notice of
Intent to Enforce, the owner may seek remedies under the Copyright Act.31 In the
case of reliance parties who have created derivative works, they may continue
exploiting those derivative works, but only upon paying the owner “reasonable
compensation,” which may be set by a U.S. district court if the parties cannot agree
on an amount.32
II. GOLAN’S SLOW MARCH TO THE SUPREME COURT
This brings us to the facts of Golan v. Holder.33 Lawrence Golan, the named
plaintiff, is the conductor of the University of Denver orchestra.34 With an annual
budget of only $4000 for music licensing fees, the school cannot afford to purchase or
license its entire repertoire and must rely on works in the public domain.35 Aided by
the Fair Use Project at The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School,
Mr. Golan filed suit in 2001, asserting that section 514 unconstitutionally removes
works from the public domain.36 The case was decided in 2005 by Lewis Babcock,
Chief Judge for the District Court of Colorado, on competing motions for summary
judgment.37
A. The First District Court Opinion
Chief Judge Babcock framed his decision in terms of three issues: (1) whether
Congress exceeded its authority in enacting section 514; (2) whether the
government’s basis for section 514 is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
specifically permits member nations to determine ‘conditions’ for applying the principles of
restoration.” See Copyright Office, supra note 21, at 50416.
29 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c)–(e).
30 URAA, supra note 23, § 514(d).
31 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2).
32 Id. § 104A(d)(3).
33 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010). The case as originally filed was Golan v.
Ashcroft; however, that earlier iteration of the case involved a challenge to the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 which was dismissed because it was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004); Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Alberto Gonzales then replaced John Ashcroft as attorney general,
and our review of the cases begins with the first opinion under the name Golan v. Gonzales. When
Eric Holder replaced Alberto Gonzales as attorney general, the case became Golan v. Holder.
34 Marc Parry, Supreme Court Takes-Up Scholars’ Rights, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 29,
2011), available at http://chronicle.com/article/A-Professors-Fight-Over/127700.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Golan v. Gonzales, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808, 1809 (D. Colo. 2005).
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interest; and (3) whether section 514 impermissibly violates the plaintiffs’ First and
Fifth Amendment rights.38 Chief Judge Babcock devoted the most attention to the
first issue, for which he analyzed copyright history from passage of the first copyright
law, the 1790 Copyright Act, and concluded that Congress had removed works from
the public domain with that enactment.39 Because three of the original thirteen
states did not have statutory copyright laws in effect prior to 1790, those three states
had only common law copyright protection, which lapsed upon publication, thereby
causing published works to fall into the public domain.40 The 1790 Copyright Act
applied to “any map, chart, book, or books already printed within these United
States,”41 which necessarily included works published in states that had no statutory
copyright protection. Because those public domain works were removed from the
public domain when their authors sought statutory protection under the new federal
law, Chief Judge Babcock viewed this as evidence that Congress had determined that
the practice of removing works from the public domain was “constitutionally
permissible.”42
On the second issue, with little discussion, Chief Judge Babcock concluded that
the government’s attempt “to promote protection of American authors by ensuring
compliance with the Berne Convention within our own borders . . . is rationally
related to, and constitutes a rational basis for, URAA [s]ection 514.”43 Lastly, Chief
Judge Babcock did not take seriously the plaintiffs’ claim that their First
Amendment rights were infringed, disposing of that argument in one sentence: “I see
no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright
enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns.”44 He gave the Fifth
Amendment due process claim slightly more thought, but concluded that, although
section 514 provides authors with retroactive benefits, it does not impose retroactive
burdens on users and, therefore, does not offend due process.45 In light of his
conclusions, Chief Judge Babcock granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment and denied the plaintiffs’.46
B. The First Tenth Circuit Opinion
Plaintiffs appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit, which issued its first opinion in
2007.47 The court first evaluated whether section 514 exceeds Congress’s authority,
and then whether section 514 requires First Amendment scrutiny.48 On the first
Id. at 1810.
Id. at 1813.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1817.
43 Id. at 1821.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1822.
46 Id.
47 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs once again raised the CTEA
argument, but the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Colorado district court and other courts that had
heard similar claims and held that Eldred v. Ashcroft precluded challenges to the CTEA. Id. at
1185.
48 Id. at 1186–87.
38
39
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question, the court concluded that Congress’s goal of compliance with the Berne
Convention was not “so irrational or so unrelated to the aims of the Copyright Clause
that it exceeds the reach of congressional power.”49 There is nothing remarkable in
this conclusion, as it is the same conclusion as that reached by other courts to have
considered the question, including the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.50
What is remarkable about the Tenth Circuit’s opinion is its conclusion that
section 514, by removing works from the public domain, alters the “traditional
contours of copyright—the peg upon which the Eldred decision hangs—and,
therefore, demands First Amendment scrutiny.51 In the Tenth Circuit’s view:
Until [section] 514, every statutory scheme preserved the same sequence. A
work progressed from (1) creation; (2) to copyright; (3) to the public domain.
Under [section] 514, the copyright sequence no longer necessarily ends with
the public domain: indeed, it may begin there. Thus, by copyrighting works
in the public domain, the URAA has altered the ordinary copyright
sequence.52
The Tenth Circuit rejected all of the government’s arguments that removing
works from the public domain had, in fact, been a traditional part of copyright law,
including the argument that had been successful at the district court level, namely
that the 1790 Copyright Act illustrated the Founders’ comfort with removing works
from the public domain: “Given the scarcity of historical evidence, we cannot
conclude that the Framers viewed removal of works from the public domain as
consistent with the copyright scheme they created. Nor do we discern at the dawn of
the Republic any burgeoning tradition of removing works from the public domain.”53
The court also characterized as unusual, rather than traditional, the two other
instances of Congress ostensibly allowing public domain works to be copyrighted,
both of which took place in response to world wars.54 Although the Eldred Court
created from whole cloth the notion that First Amendment scrutiny of copyright laws
Id. at 1187.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Eldred involved a challenge to the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, which lengthened the term of copyright to life-plus-seventy years to
align with European Union law. Id. at 193. The Supreme Court upheld the extension as a valid
exercise of Congress’s power under the copyright clause and also concluded that, although copyright
laws were not immune from First Amendment scrutiny, such scrutiny was only necessary when the
“traditional contours of copyright” were altered. Id. at 221.
51 Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1187–88.
52 Id. at 1189.
53 Id. at 1191.
54 Id. at 1191–92. The court noted:
[T]he government argues that the wartime acts of Dec. 18, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66102, 41 Stat. 368, and the Emergency Copyright Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-258,
55 Stat. 732, removed works from the public domain by granting the President
authority to give foreign authors additional time to comply with copyright
requirements. However, a review of the historical record reveals that these
emergency wartime bills, passed in response to exigent circumstances, merely
altered the means by which authors could comply with procedural rules for
copyright; these bills were not explicit attempts to remove works from the public
domain.
Id.
49
50

[11:83 2011]

Golan v. Holder:
Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment

91

is only necessary when the traditional contours of copyright are altered, lower courts
are now bound to analyze copyright laws within that framework. Because section
514 removes works from the public domain, which is not a traditional contour of
copyright, and because the plaintiffs have a First Amendment speech interest in
using those public domain works, the Tenth Circuit concluded that section 514 must
be given full First Amendment scrutiny, which the district court did not do.55
Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court for the appropriate First
Amendment review.56
C. The Second District Court Opinion
On remand, the case was decided once again by Chief Judge Babcock under
standard First Amendment jurisprudence. The initial step in traditional First
Amendment analysis is to determine whether the law in question is content-neutral
or content-based, which in turn determines the level of scrutiny applied to the law
and the level of importance that the government must demonstrate in order to
sustain the law.
The parties and Chief Judge Babcock agreed that section 514 is a contentneutral regulation of speech.57 As will be demonstrated in Part V, plaintiffs should
not have conceded this fact and should have argued that section 514 is content-based
and thereby requires a higher level of scrutiny. Alternatively, as Part V also posits,
plaintiffs could have argued that regardless of the nature of the speech regulation
contemplated by section 514, the statute cannot stand against a First Amendment
phrased as it is—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”58
The purpose in this section, however, is merely to outline the analysis undertaken by
the district court of a concededly content-neutral statute.
In the words of the court,
‘A content-neutral regulation [of speech] will be sustained under the First
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests.’ While a content-neutral
restriction must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest’ unrelated to the suppression of free speech, it ‘need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.’ The requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied so long as the restriction promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
restriction . . . . ‘So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,’ the restriction will not

Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1197.
57 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55
56
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be invalid simply because ‘the government’s interest could be adequately
served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.’59
The government offered three interests which, in its view, are significant enough
to justify the burden on speech imposed by section 514: (1) compliance with treaty
obligations; (2) protection of U.S. copyright owners’ interests; and (3) correction of
“historic inequities wrought on foreign authors who lost their United States
copyrights through no fault of their own.”60
Chief Judge Babcock acknowledged that compliance with international treaties
is an important governmental interest but pointed out that even a treaty is subject to
constitutional limitations, including the First Amendment.61 In keeping with
conventional First Amendment analysis, Chief Judge Babcock considered whether
section 514 is “substantially broader than necessary to achieve” the goal of complying
with the Berne Convention and TRIPS.62 As part of that analysis, Chief Judge
Babcock had to determine whether section 514 excludes a substantial amount of
speech from First Amendment protection, the “unprotected speech.” The government
pointed out that the reliance provisions of section 514 protect plaintiffs from liability
for copying that occurred before the copyright was restored and allow plaintiffs two
options with respect to derivative works—one year in which to sell or use copies
made before restoration of copyright, or payment of a royalty for exploitation beyond
the one-year period.63 This constitutes the “protected speech,” but it leaves
unprotected “any speech that involves copying more than one year after notice has
been filed, and any derivative works made after notice is filed and without payment
of a royalty.”64 In Chief Judge Babcock’s view, this amount of unprotected speech is a
substantial amount, which necessitates determining whether that unprotected
speech is or is not “‘tied to the Government’s interest’ in complying with the Berne
Convention.”65
Plaintiffs argued that Article 18 of the Berne Convention allows member nations
discretion in implementing copyright restoration statutes, and Chief Judge Babcock
ruled that in light of this discretion, “Congress could have complied with the Berne
Convention without interfering with a substantial amount of protected speech . . . .”66
Thus, by limiting the First Amendment speech rights of reliance parties, section 514
burdens speech in a way that is not required by the Berne Convention and is,
therefore, not tied to the government’s interest. Because those speech limitations are
not tied to the government’s interest in complying with the Berne Convention, Chief
Judge Babcock found that section 514 is “substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the government’s interest” and that summary judgment for plaintiffs was
appropriate on that question.67

Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1170–71 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1172.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1173.
64 Id.
65 Id. (citations omitted).
66 Id. at 1174.
67 Id. at 1174–75.
59
60

[11:83 2011]

Golan v. Holder:
Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment

93

As to the government’s second justification for section 514, that it protects U.S.
authors’ interests abroad, Chief Judge Babcock found that it was “largely intertwined
with its argument regarding compliance with Article 18 of the Berne Convention—a
justification which has been rejected as insufficient to justify the infringement of
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights above.”68 The government made a half-hearted
attempt to argue that by not protecting foreign authors’ restoration rights, the
United States opens the door to “reprisals” by other Berne Convention members
against our authors; however, Chief Judge Babcock disposed of that argument by
simply pointing to the text of the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention only
allows for reprisals against nationals of countries that are not members of the Berne
Convention. Because the United States is a member of the Berne Convention, the
reprisals article does not apply.69 Therefore, summary judgment for plaintiffs was
appropriate on that issue.70
Lastly, Chief Judge Babcock addressed the government’s argument that it has a
significant interest in correcting historical inequities by restoring U.S. copyright
protection to foreign authors who lost it through no fault of their own.71 The force of
this argument is blunted by the fact that section 514 itself creates further inequities
in that it applies only to foreign authors.72 A U.S. national who lost his U.S.
copyright for failing to comply with formalities cannot have his copyright restored
under section 514. As Chief Judge Babcock points out, “[r]ather than correct an
historic inequity, [s]ection 514 appears to create an inequity where one formerly did
not exist. The Government proffers no evidence showing how granting foreign
authors copyrights in the United States—yet denying similar protections to United
States authors—could constitute an important Government interest.”73 Thus,
summary judgment for plaintiffs was appropriate on this issue as well.74 In sum,
Chief Judge Babcock found that section 514 burdened substantially more speech
than necessary in order to achieve compliance with the Berne Convention and
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.75
Unsurprisingly, the government appealed Chief Judge Babcock’s ruling to the
Tenth Circuit. However, the plaintiffs also appealed, on the grounds that:
[Chief Judge Babcock’s decision] fails to adjudicate the question of whether
section 514 of the URAA is unconstitutional on its face; fails to enjoin
Defendant Holder, his successor, and his subordinates from enforcing
copyrights created by section 514 for all works that have previously been in
the public domain; and fails to order Defendant Peters, her successor, and
her subordinates to cancel all copyright registrations of works whose
Id. at 1175 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
70 Id. at 1176–77.
71 Id. at 1176. The government seems to forget here that section 514 also restores copyright
protection to authors who failed to comply with formalities such as notice and renewal, the blame for
which failure must lie squarely with the authors.
72 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(3) (2006) (defining an “eligible country” as one “other than the
United States”).
73 Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
74 Id.
75 Id.
68
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copyright status was restored under section 514 of the URAA and to refrain
from issuing registrations for any such works in the future.76
D. The Second Tenth Circuit Opinion
In June 2010, the Tenth Circuit issued its second opinion in the case, reversing
the district court and finding that section 514 does not violate the First
Amendment.77 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, and for free speech advocates,
constitutional challenges to statutes are reviewed de novo, giving the Tenth Circuit
justification to substitute its own judgment in place of the district court’s judgment.78
The parties and the court once again agreed that section 514 is a content-neutral
regulation of speech.79 The government offered the same three justifications for
section 514 that it had advanced at the district court level: (1) compliance with
treaties, (2) protecting U.S. authors’ copyright interests abroad, and (3) remedying
past inequities.80 This time, however, the court agreed with the government that it
has “a substantial interest in protecting American copyright holders’ interests
abroad, and section 514 is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”81
The court began by evaluating the government’s interest and whether it was
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”82 The plaintiffs argued that the
government was attempting a “‘reallocation of speech interests’ between American
reliance parties and American copyright holders” and that this reallocation does not
qualify as an important governmental interest.83 The court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs have a First Amendment interest in using the public domain works, but it
countered their interest by pointing out that U.S. authors also have a First
Amendment right to secure their “economic and expressive interests” through foreign
copyright.84 In the court’s view, the authors’ interests “are at least as important or
substantial as other interests that the Supreme Court has found to be sufficiently
important or substantial to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.”85
In deciding whether section 514 “was ‘designed to address a real harm, and
whether [it] will alleviate [that harm] in a material way,’”86 the Tenth Circuit largely
deferred to Congress. The court seems to have been under the impression that
Congress was able to carefully weigh the implications of section 514 during
consideration of the URAA. However, in light of the fact that Congress was not
permitted to make any changes to the URAA—it was negotiated by the Clinton
76 Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at 1–
2, Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009) (No. 1:01-CV-1854). The reference,
“Peters,” is to Defendant Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights at the time the case was heard.
Ms. Peters has since retired and was succeeded by Maria Pallante on June 1, 2011.
77 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010).
78 Id. at 1082.
79 Id. at 1083.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1084.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1084 (alteration in original).
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Administration and the United States Trade Representative, and Congress was
forced to accept or reject it as a whole87—the court’s deference was probably
misplaced in this instance. The court also probably put too much weight on the fact
that “Congress heard testimony addressing the interests of American copyright
holders,”88 failing to properly consider the source of that testimony, namely, the
Recording Industry Association of America, the International Intellectual Property
Alliance, and the Motion Picture Association of America—i.e., industry
representatives, all of whom had a financial interest in passing section 514 despite
its First Amendment problems.89
The court ultimately concluded that section 514 does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to advance the government’s interest.90 The court first
reiterated the Supreme Court’s view that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use
are sufficient “built-in” First Amendment protections and then concluded that
because section 514 does nothing to “disturb these traditional, built-in protections,” it
does not burden a substantial amount of speech that would otherwise be protected by
the First Amendment.91 The court seems to have forgotten that the question is
whether the traditional contours of copyright are altered, not whether the Supreme
Court’s so-called “built-in First Amendment protections” remain in place.
After determining that section 514 does not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to advance what is an important government interest and is thus
narrowly tailored, the court decided that despite the fact that other, less restrictive
means could have been used to comply with the Berne Convention, Congress was not
required to choose those less restrictive means.92 In light of these conclusions, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that section 514 violates the First
Amendment, finding instead that section 514 is “consistent with the First
Amendment.”93 The court also refused to find section 514 unconstitutional on its
face, as plaintiffs requested in their cross-appeal.94 With the Tenth Circuit’s
reversal, the stage was set for an appeal to the Supreme Court.
III. ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Following the Tenth Circuit decision, the plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 7,
2011.95 Plaintiffs, now petitioners, filed their merits brief on June 14, 2011,96 and the

Karp, supra note 23, at 185–86.
Golan, 609 F.3d at 1085.
89 Id. at 1085–88.
90 Id. at 1094.
91 Id. at 1091 n.9.
92 Id. at 1091–94.
93 Id. at 1094.
94 Id.
95 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545),
2010 WL 4232641.
96 Brief for the Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011
WL 2423674 [hereinafter Pets. Br.].
87
88
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government, now respondents, filed its merits brief on August 3, 2011.97 Petitioners
filed their reply brief on August 31, 2011.98
Meanwhile, this case attracted the active interest of several organizations in
favor of both parties. In addition to two amicus briefs filed in support of the
certiorari petition,99 sixteen organizations filed amicus briefs in support of petitioners
and eight organizations filed amicus briefs in support of respondents. Out of these
sixteen amicus briefs supporting petitioner, three amici focused their arguments on
the Copyright Clause violation,100 and six amici focused on the First Amendment
violation.101 Six amici argued that section 514 violated both the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment,102 and one amicus argued that treaties, including the
URAA, do not expand Congress’s legislative authority.103 The eight remaining
amicus briefs supported respondents and argued that section 514 was not
unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment.104
97 Brief for the Respondents, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545),
2011 WL 3379598 [hereinafter Resps. Br.].
98 Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545),
2011 WL 4500811 [hereinafter Pets. Reply Br.].
99 Brief for Internet Archive as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609
F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2010 WL 4876471; Brief of the Conductors Guild as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2010
WL 4874473.
100 Brief of Peter Decherney as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder,
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470832, at *2; Brief for Creative Commons
Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470826, at *5–6 (June 20, 2011) (No. 10-545); Brief of Pub. Domain
Interests as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4–6, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470829, at * 4–7.
101 Brief of Daniel J. Gervais as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Golan v.
Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470824, *2–3; Brief of Pub.
Knowledge as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th
Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470822, at *2–3; Brief of Info. Soc’y Project at Yale Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No.
10-545), 2011 WL 2470834, at *2; Brief of the Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL
2578555, at *5–6; Brief of the Conductors Guild as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3,
Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2010 WL 4874473, at *3; Brief of
Project Petrucci, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d
1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2578554, at *3.
102 Brief of H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui and Tyler T. Ochoa as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 1–2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470823,
at *1–2; Brief of Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 4–5, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470821, at *4–5;
Brief of Heartland Angels, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Golan v. Holder,
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470833, at *5–6; Brief of Justice and
Freedom Fund as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076
(10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2470825, at *2; Brief of Am. Library Ass’n, et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, 28, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10545), 2011 WL 2533007, at *28; Brief for Google, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
8–9, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2533006, at *8–9.
103 Brief of The Cato Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Golan v. Holder,
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 2532843, at *2–3.
104 Brief for the Int’l Publishers Ass’n et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4–
5, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3467247, at *4–5; Brief of
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The Supreme Court will address whether section 514 of the URAA violates
either of two constitutional provisions:
the Copyright Clause or the First
Amendment.
The petitioners’ brief also addresses the respondents’ previous
argument that Congress can avoid these constitutional provisions by invoking the
Commerce Clause or its Treaty Power.105 Respondents do not address this argument
at length in their brief, but they explain in a footnote that if the Court finds section
514 to have violated the Copyright Clause, but not the First Amendment, it should
remand the case to the court of appeals.106 There, the lower court would determine
whether another enumerated Congressional power could uphold section 514, an issue
preserved by the government below.107 In their reply brief, petitioners contend that
respondents did not preserve this issue below, or if they did, that the questions can
and should be resolved by the Court itself without remand.108
Focusing on the main issues, this Part elucidates each of the parties’ arguments
with respect to the Copyright Clause and, primarily, the First Amendment.
A. Whether Section 514 Violates the Copyright Clause.
As noted above, on this case’s first appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that section
514 did not violate the Copyright Clause.109 The next two opinions, by the district
court and then the Tenth Circuit on the case’s second appeal, focused on the First
Amendment questions at stake.110 Before the Supreme Court, petitioners again
argue that section 514 violates the Copyright Clause; the government disagrees. The
parties base their arguments on the Clause’s text, the Framers’ intentions, and
consistent historical practice.

the Int’l Coal. for Copyright Prot. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Golan v. Holder,
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2009 WL 3760476, at *3; Brief of The Am. Soc’y of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Golan v.
Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561885, at *3; Brief of Intellectual
Prop. Owners Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d
1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561889, at *2–3; Brief for the Motion Picture Ass’n of
Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–8 , Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.
2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561888, at *7–8; Brief of the Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 4–5 , Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011
WL 3561887, at *4–5; Brief of Franklin Pierce Ctr. for Intellectual Prop. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 2, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL
3561883, at *2, 5; Brief of Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2–3, Golan v. Holder, , 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-545).
105 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 62.
106 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 33 n.15.
107 Id.
108 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 22–23.
109 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 57–94 and accompanying text.
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1. Does the Text of the Copyright Clause Prohibit Removal of Works from the Public
Domain?
Petitioners and respondents first squabble over the actual text of the Copyright
Clause and whether it allows—or prohibits—removal of works from the public
domain. As stated by the Court in its most recent seminal copyright case, Eldred v.
Ashcroft,111 the Constitution defines Congress’s copyright power in its Copyright
Clause: “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”112
Petitioners cite Supreme Court copyright cases that define the public domain
based on this clause.113 Most importantly for Golan, petitioners cite the Court’s 1966
patent opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co.114 which states, “Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”115
Petitioners conclude from this patent case that in copyright law as well, “[u]pon
entering the public domain, a work must remain there.”116 Section 514, petitioners
argue, violates this concept and “evaporated” the public’s right to access these
materials that had entered the public domain.117 Respondents, on the other hand,
acknowledge that the Copyright Clause imposes “various constraints” on Congress’s
authority, but they contend “[s]ection 514 is fully consistent with each of those
limitations.”118 Respondents cast aside petitioners’ textual restriction as “an
additional, atextual limitation” created by and for the petitioners.119
Although the parties use the same definition of “limited [t]imes,”120 they
disagree on the definition’s implications for section 514. Quoting Eldred, they both
define “limited” as having the same meaning at the Framing as it has now:
“‘confine[d] within certain bounds,’ ‘restrain[ed],’ or ‘circumscribe[d].’”121 According to
petitioners, “[r]emoving works from the public domain violates the [Copyright
Clause’s] ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction by turning a fixed and predictable period into
one that can be reset or resurrected at anytime, even after it expires.”122 When a
work enters the public domain, petitioners argue that this “entry . . . must mark the
end of protection, not an intermission. Otherwise, there is no way for members of the
public to know if the limit has been reached, and no way to rely on it.”123 Petitioners
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, (2003).
Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
113 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 21–22 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964)).
114 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
115 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 22 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 23.
118 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 13–14.
119 Id. at 14.
120 See Pets. Br., supra note 97, at 21; Resps. Br., supra note 98, at 15.
121 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 21 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199); Resps. Br., supra note 97,
at 14.
122 Id. at 22.
123 Id. at 23.
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conclude that section 514’s removal of works from the public domain “violated the
plain and sensible meaning of the ‘limited [t]imes’ restriction.”124 Respondents, on
the other hand, interpret the limitation as prohibiting Congress from granting
permanent copyrights.125 They find that section 514’s restored copyrights are
“‘limited’ in the relevant respect” simply because they have expiration dates.126 In
their reply brief, petitioners call respondents’ expiration-date limit “illusory.”127
Under this limit, petitioners worry that “there is no way for the public to tell if the
limit has been reached or rely on it,” and that “nothing stops [the government] from
reaching back hundreds of years” to remove more works from the public domain.128
Thus, the two parties thus read the same terms—“limited [t]imes”—to reach two
opposite results regarding section 514.
Similarly, the parties disagree on the import of the Copyright Clause’s preamble,
that “Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.”129 Respondents point out that petitioners cite no precedent holding that
the preamble is “an independent limitation” on Congress’s authority.130 Still,
petitioners argue that the preamble does limit Congress’s copyright power.131 Based
on definitions from Framing-era dictionaries, petitioners define “progress” as having
meant “the advancement of knowledge, as well as its spread,”132 and they define
“science” as having “referred to knowledge and learning.”133 Thus, they conclude that
Congress’s copyright legislation must promote “progress,” defined as “the creation
and spread of knowledge and learning.”134 Rather than encourage this artistic
innovation, petitioners assert that section 514 “inhibits the spread of existing works,
reduces the universe of material available to the public for further creation, and
threatens to destroy the incentive to use even those works that remain
unprotected.”135
Respondents disagree, stating that if the preamble is a limitation, then section
514 promotes international progress as required by “today’s global economy.”136
Respondents relate petitioners’ argument to the argument rejected in Eldred that
expansion of copyright law covering existing works serves no incentive purpose
because the works have already been created.137 Eldred recognized that Congress
was not required to aim all copyright legislation at incentivizing the creation of new
works, and that the United States’ international leadership role required
participation in “give-and-take” negotiations.138 Here, respondents argue that section
Id. at 25.
Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 13.
126 Id. at 14–15.
127 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 1.
128 Id.
129 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
130 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 16.
131 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 21.
132 Id.
133 Id.; Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 5, 11–12 (1966).
134 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 21.
135 Id. at 24.
136 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 17.
137 Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214–17 (2003)).
138 Id. (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206).
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514 promotes the country’s international leadership efforts in negotiating copyright
laws, thus promoting its overall progress.139 Petitioners reply that respondents
merely “insis[t] without explanation that copyright statutes promote ‘progress’
whenever they involved ‘“participation” in [the] international system.’”140
Thus, petitioners make a textual argument that section 514 violates the
Copyright Clause, but respondents reply that this text does not restrain Congress
from enacting section 514.
2. Did the Framers Intend to Create a Permanent and Stable Public Domain from
Which Works Could Not Be Removed?
Petitioners next appeal to the originalists on the Court by turning to the
Framers’ intentions regarding the public domain.141 Petitioners explain that the
Framers were familiar with the potential perils of English monopolies, the equivalent
of U.S. copyright and patent law.142 Petitioners conclude from this history that the
Founders and Framers recognized the importance of spreading knowledge, and that
they enacted the Copyright Clause to “facilitat[e] the release of . . . works to the
public”143 in “a stable and permanent public domain.”144
Respondents do not directly counter petitioners’ originalist argument, but they
mention the actions of certain Framers in their discussion of Congressional historical
practice and what they interpret as its support for removal of works from the public
domain.145
3. Does Historical Practice Confirm that Congress Cannot Restore Copyrights to
Public Domain Works?
History always teaches, although its message may be unclear—and here, each
party uses Congressional history to bolster its own argument. In Eldred, the
Supreme Court held that Congress’s “unbroken” historical practice affirmed its
authorization to extend copyright terms.146 Petitioners accordingly cite similarly
“unbroken” Congressional practice of leaving works untouched in the public domain
as confirmation of Congress’s lack of authorization to copyright public domain
works.147 Respondents, however, interpret historical practice differently to affirm
Congress’s power to protect works already in the public domain.148

Id.
Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 3 (quoting Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 17).
141 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 25–30.
142 Id. at 26.
143 Id. at 14, 30.
144 Id. at 25–26.
145 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 24–25.
146 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 31 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003)).
147 Id.
148 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 17–33.
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The parties’ first historical disagreement focuses on whether the public domain
existed in 1790, when Congress enacted the first federal copyright law.149 Petitioners
explain that without federal copyright law, “the public domain of the United States”
did not yet exist,150 but respondents assert that the first federal copyright statute
removed works from the existing public domain of the 1790s.151 As petitioners
acknowledge, copyright protection varied greatly under state law in 1790, leaving
many works unprotected—and thus free for the public to exploit—in different
states.152 Respondents assert that this public freedom placed these works in the
public domain until Congress’s 1790 act copyrighted many of them.153 Petitioners
accuse respondents of “tr[ying] to rewrite history by misconstruing the first
Copyright Act.”154 Citing language in this act, petitioners explain that “the 1790 Act
explicitly presupposes existing copyrights,” thus not applying to any works that were
not already under copyright protection.155
Petitioners assert that over the next two hundred years, Congress did not
remove works from the public domain in any of its nineteen amendments to the
Copyright Act.156 Respondents point to several separate, private patent and
copyright bills, however, that removed individual works from the public domain.157
Petitioners acknowledge “this trickle of private bills that ended in the nineteenth
century,”158 but note that they “[e]ach apparently reflected an isolated judgment by
Congress” and that they do not compare with section 514’s application to potentially
millions of public domain works.159 Further, petitioners note that the copyright bills
do not appear to have been challenged in court.160 Respondents concede this point,
but assert the relevance of the “uniformly favorable judicial rulings” when the
individual patent bills were challenged.161 Petitioners respond to these patent
rulings by again citing the Court’s conclusion in Graham that Congress does not have
plenary power to patent inventions in the public domain.162
Respondents also cite laws that applied beyond individual copyrights and
patents. Congress excused failure to comply with certain formalities for patents in
1832 and copyrights in 1893, and it authorized copyright protection for foreign works

Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 31.
Id.
151 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 18.
152 Id. at 18–20.
153 Id. at 21.
154 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 5.
155 Id. at 6.
156 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 31.
157 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 24 (citing An Act for the Relief of Levi H. Corson, ch. 57, 9 Stat.
763 (Feb. 19, 1849); An Act for the Relief of William Tod Helmuth, ch. 543, 18 Stat., pt. 3, at 618
(June 23, 1874); An Act for the Relief of Judson Jones, ch. 29, 30 Stat. 396 (Feb. 17, 1898); An Act for
the Relief of Mistress Henry R. Schoolcraft, ch. 16, 11 Stat. 557 (Jan. 25, 1859); An Act for the Relief
of Mrs. William L. Herndon, ch. 99, 14 Stat. 587 (May 24, 1866)).
158 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 9.
159 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 40.
160 Id.
161 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 25–26, 31.
162 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 40–41 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)).
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in the public domain during World War I and II in 1919 and 1941.163 The 1919 Act
allowed reliance parties to retain all rights acquired prior to the Act, and the 1941
Act permitted continued exploitation of works by reliance parties for one year.164
Although these statutes do not appear to have been challenged in court, respondents
derive support from an analogous Supreme Court case, McClurg v. Kingsland,165
concerning a similar patent statute.166 Petitioners differentiate McClurg167 and
dismiss these wartime copyright laws because Congress did not premise these Acts
on its Article I authority, the Acts were never challenged in court, and, at most, the
Acts were mere exceptions in the “exigency of wartime.”168 Respondents argue that
these explanations would not excuse Congressional exceptions “if petitioners’ basic
constitutional theory were correct” that historical precedent determines whether
Congress can remove works from the public domain.169 Petitioners maintain that
these unchallenged, constitutionally questionable, wartime acts “merely suggest
Congress may provide limited relief in the rare case in which it is factually
impossible for an author or inventor to comply with statutory requirements . . . .”170
Lastly, respondents dispute that petitioners’ citation of a judicially recognized
“federal right to ‘copy and use’”171 public domain works is a “constitutional right or a
restriction on the power of Congress.”172 Rather than containing an affirmative right,
respondents define public domain works as “contingent on the scope of federal patent
and copyright statutes” and thus subject to Congressional revision.173 Respondents
interpret the relevant cases as affirming that courts “should respect the various
balances struck by Congress in its patent and copyright statutes.”174
* * *
In all, petitioners conclude that section 514 violates the Copyright Clause’s
specific limitations by removing works from the public domain.175 Respondents
instead argue that section 514 is a “rational means of achieving [Congress’s goals]”
and that it “easily satisfies [the applicable] deferential standard” of review.176

163 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 26–27 (citing Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 3, 4 Stat. 559; Act
of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 215, 27 Stat. 743; Act of Dec. 18, 1919, ch. 11, 41 Stat. 368; Act of Sept. 25, 1941
(1941 Act), ch. 421, 55 Stat. 732).
164 Id. at 27 (citing 1919 Act, 41 Stat. 369; 1941 Act, 55 Stat. 732).
165 McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843).
166 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 28. In McClurg, the Court allowed the retroactive application
of an 1839 patent law amendment to protect an invention that would have otherwise been void. Id.
(citing McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206–09).
167 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 12 (“[N]o party in that case challenged the
constitutionality of any statute on any ground[,] . . . the patent at issue . . . was not in the public
domain[,] . . . [and] the holding of McClurg is that defendants did not infringe because they had a
license.”).
168 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 39–40.
169 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 29.
170 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 9.
171 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 32 (quoting Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 22) (emphasis in
original).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 32–33.
175 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 19.
176 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 33.

[11:83 2011]

Golan v. Holder:
Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment

103

B. Whether Section 514 Violates the First Amendment.
Whereas petitioners’ Copyright Clause argument was not accepted in the lower
courts, petitioners achieved more success with their First Amendment argument. As
noted above, the Tenth Circuit recognized on its first appeal that section 514 altered
the “traditional contours of copyright” and thus was subject to heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.177 On remand, the district court held that section 514
burdened substantially more speech than necessary and thus failed this First
Amendment review.178 On its second appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit held that
section 514 was subject to this level of scrutiny, but that it survived the review based
on the government’s interest in protecting the rights of U.S. authors abroad.179
Before the Supreme Court, both parties again agree that section 514 is a
content-neutral statute and that it is subject to intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny if it burdens speech rights.180 Petitioners argue that section 514 is subject to
and fails this intermediate scrutiny and that it is substantially overbroad.
Respondents argue first that section 514 does not trigger heightened First
Amendment review, and then that if such scrutiny is warranted, section 514 is
narrowly tailored to further important governmental interests and thus it survives
this review.
1. Is Section 514 Subject to First Amendment Scrutiny?
Petitioners assert that section 514 is subject to First Amendment scrutiny,181
and respondents argue that heightened First Amendment scrutiny is not
warranted.182 In Eldred, the Court held that copyright law had “built-in free speech
safeguards” that generally protect speech interests and remove any need for further
First Amendment scrutiny unless Congress alters “the traditional contours of
copyright protection.”183 Petitioners contend that section 514 does alter these
contours “in a dramatic and unprecedented way.”184 Based on two hundred years of
consistent historical practice, petitioners contend that Congressional revisions to
copyright law have traditionally left the public domain intact.185 Section 514 alters
this historical practice by removing works from the public domain, making copyright
law “unreliable and unpredictable,” and imposing a “substantial chilling effect” on
the intended uses of the public domain.186 Thus, petitioners see the altered contours
as earning heightened First Amendment review.
Respondents disagree with this premise. They contend that the Tenth Circuit,
on its initial appeal, “misread” Eldred to mandate First Amendment scrutiny
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57–75 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 77–94 and accompanying text.
180 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 47; Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 42.
181 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 42–43.
182 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 35.
183 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
184 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 43.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 44.
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whenever a copyright statute deviated from “any ‘traditional contou[r]’ or ‘timehonored tradition’ of copyright protection.”187 Respondents instead read these
“traditional contours” within Eldred’s greater context, concluding that the relevant
contours are “best understood” as the historic lines “between an author’s exclusive
rights” and the public’s rights in a copyrighted work.188
Specifically, the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are of “particular significance.”189
Section 514, respondents point out, does not alter either of these doctrines, and
thus—like in Eldred—further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.190
Regarding copyright law’s “built-in free speech safeguards,” the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine, petitioners find them “plainly inadequate” to
absolve section 514 from First Amendment scrutiny.191 Prior to section 514,
petitioners and the public “had the unrestricted right to perform, copy, teach and
distribute the entire work, for any reason.”192 Whereas the idea/expression dichotomy
and fair use doctrine permit certain types of restricted access to the works, “[p]laying
a few bars of a Shostakovich symphony is no substitute for performing the entire
work.”193 Petitioners explain that Eldred did not state or even suggest that there
were only two applicable safeguards.194 Further, petitioners argue that irrevocable
entry into the public domain was not relevant to the facts in Eldred, and that the
public domain actually has more historic and Framing-era significance than either of
Eldred’s two safeguards.195 Thus, because leaving the public domain intact is “a
defining feature” and “an essential safeguard” of copyright law, petitioners assert
that heightened First Amendment scrutiny must be applied.196
To disprove respondents’ analogy of Golan to Eldred, and its attendant result,
petitioners differentiate the speech interests at stake in each case.197 On the one
hand, in Eldred, the affected works had never entered the public domain, so the
Court identified the speech interests as “no more than the right to make ‘other
people’s speeches.’”198 Under section 514, on the other hand, petitioners assert “the
right to make the speeches that belonged to them and to the American public . . . .”199
Petitioners further cite case law to assert that First Amendment rights “do not
become less important” when they involve another’s expression.200
Respondents disagree, stating that the “practical effect” of the challenged
statutes in both Eldred and Golan “is to limit, for finite temporal periods, the use of a
defined category of works of authorship that would have been subject to unrestricted
public exploitation” without the statutes.201 Unlike petitioners, respondents do not
Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 35.
Id. at 37.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 37–38.
191 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 46.
192 Id. at 46–47 (emphasis in original).
193 Id. at 47.
194 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 15.
195 Id. at 16.
196 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 47.
197 Id. at 44–45.
198 Id. at 44 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 45–46.
201 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 38.
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find meaningful the distinction that section 514 removes works that already rested in
the public domain.202 Petitioners contend that these interests are “vested and
established public speech rights,”203 but respondents note that section 514 avoids
imposing retroactive liability, and that petitioners cite no case law supporting a
“vested” right to prevent a restriction that otherwise survives First Amendment
scrutiny.204
Further, respondents state that petitioners’ claimed harm of diminishment of
investment value is not a sufficient economic effect to constitute a constitutional
violation.205
Even if section 514 disappointed petitioners investment-backed
expectations, respondents argue that no Supreme Court precedent “suggest[s] that
[this] disappointment . . . can raise First Amendment concerns simply because the
relevant investments pertain to expressive activities.”206 Respondents explain that
this economic diminishment would “more naturally” premise a claim under the Due
Process clause—abandoned by the petitioners in the lower court—or the Just
Compensation Clause—not asserted by petitioners.207 In a footnote, respondents
recognize that copyright laws that violate “some independent First Amendment
prohibition”—such as those premised on an author’s viewpoint—would raise
“[d]ifferent constitutional issues.”208
Respondents also acknowledge that “the
restrictions traditionally associated with copyright law could not constitutionally be
imposed on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis.”209 But respondents assert that
“nothing of that sort is at issue here.”210
Respondents also argue that, on its first appeal, the Tenth Circuit “misread the
historical record” to find that section 514 was not consistent with the “traditional
contours” of copyright law.211 Respondents warn that this reading places “a broad
range” of previous copyright law revisions under heightened First Amendment
scrutiny each time Congress departed from prior copyright practice, including the
extensions of protection to sound recordings and architectural works.212 Respondents
also caution that this interpretation would “substantially undermin[e]” judicial
deference to Congress on copyright legislation.213 Nevertheless, respondents refer to
their earlier historical analysis214 to state that section 514 is consistent with the

Id.
Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 45 (citing Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionality of
Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 701–02
(2000) (“[T]here is a First Amendment right to publish freely works that are in the public domain.”)).
204 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 38–39.
205 Id. at 39 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992)).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 39 n.17.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 35.
212 Id. at 40 (citing Copyright Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(7) (2006)); Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5133 (17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2006))).
213 Id.
214 See supra text accompanying notes 168–212.
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“frequen[t]” Congressional practice of removing works from the public domain,
beginning with its first copyright law in 1790.215
Lastly, respondents describe the applicability of “[t]he same two First
Amendment ‘supplements’ on which the Court relied in Eldred.”216
These
‘supplements’ established that copyright law exemptions apply to certain uses of
copyrighted works by institutions such as libraries and small businesses.217
Respondents point to the URAA’s “additional accommodation,” such as its provisions
for reliance parties.218 Respondents mention that copyright holders sent “fewer than
50,000” notices of their intent to enforce, and that reliance parties who did not
receive notices may continue exploitation of the works.219 Respondents’ statistic
counts only notices sent to the Copyright Office, and ignores the potentially millions
of notices that were or will be sent directly to reliance parties, as the URAA
permits.220
Thus, petitioners agree with the lower Golan opinions that intermediate
scrutiny should apply to section 514, whereas respondents argue that this heightened
level of scrutiny should not apply.
2. Does Section 514 Survive Heightened First Amendment Scrutiny?
Petitioners explain that section 514 fails heightened First Amendment scrutiny,
and thus that section 514 violates the First Amendment. Respondents, however,
assert three potential justifications for section 514: Berne Convention compliance,
promoting U.S. authors abroad, and remedying prior inequities for foreign authors.
This Part examines each of the respondents’ justifications in turn, coupled with the
petitioners’ arguments against them.
a. Does the Government’s Interest in Complying with the Berne Convention Justify
Section 514?
The parties first dispute whether the government’s interest in complying with
the Berne Convention justifies section 514. Petitioners argue that the government
cannot justify section 514 based on its interest incompliance with the Berne
Convention,221 but respondents assert that section 514 is narrowly tailored to achieve
this goal.222 Petitioners argue that the government did not assert the “substantial
evidence of real harm” from apparent noncompliance required to justify its burden on
speech.223 Before enacting section 514, the United States had already secured

Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 40.
Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003)).
217 Id. at 40–41 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(h), 110(5)(B) (2006)).
218 Id. at 41.
219 Id. at 41–42.
220 See supra text accompanying note 28.
221 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 51.
222 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 53–54.
223 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 53.
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protection for its authors by joining the Berne Convention.224 In 1988, Congress
concluded that it did not need to remove works from the public domain to comply
with the Berne Convention, and that the United States was in compliance with the
Berne Convention.225
Respondents claim that, in 1994, “Congress and the Executive Branch revisited
implementation of Article 18, and Congress enacted [s]ection 514 of the URAA.”226
Petitioners dispute this fact, explaining that “[t]he URAA was drafted by the [U.S.
Trade Representative] and sent to Congress under a fast track procedure that
precluded amendment.”227 The Office of the United States Trade Representative
confirmed that “restoration was discretionary,”228 and “Congress did not revisit any of
the findings it made in 1988,” or make any findings that the Berne Convention or
TRIPS compliance required enactment of section 514.229 If the lack of restoration did
cause any noncompliance, “the only apparent consequence” was that a few Berne
Convention member countries, such as Thailand and Russia, “had apparently
declined to restore copyright protection to U.S. works” in their public domains.230
According to the petitioners, any U.S. interest in “creating economic windfalls” for
American authors in these few countries is not a legitimate, or important enough,
interest to justify section 514’s burden on speech.231
Responding to this argument, respondents first state that the Berne
Convention’s restoration requirements are not in dispute in that they technically
require restoration of foreign works.232 The government may have an important
interest, they argue, in avoiding harms such as not experiencing the “full benefits” of
Berne Convention membership unless its “international partners” recognize U.S.
compliance,233 maintaining the United States’ “international credibility,” and
reducing the chance that other countries would challenge its Article 18
implementation under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and with potential
trade sanctions.234 Respondents cite the Executive Branch’s advice to Congress that
a WTO challenge was “likely.”235 Petitioners question the importance of avoiding
WTO challenges, considering that the United States has lost at least thirty-seven of
its 128 or more formal disputes before the WTO, and that it has done nothing in
response to a ten-year-old WTO ruling that another U.S. copyright law violates
TRIPS.236
Id. at 52.
Id.
226 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 46.
227 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 17.
228 Pets. Br., supra note 96 at 52–53 (citing Joint House and S. Comm. Hearings on the URAA,
103d Cong. 2 (1994) (statement of Chairman William J. Hughes)).
229 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 17–18.
230 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 53.
231 Id.
232 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 43.
233 Id. at 44.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 45 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Intellectual Property
Provisions: Joint Hearing Before Subcomms. of the H. & S. Comms. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong. 137 (1994) (statement of Ira S. Shapiro, Gen. Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR))).
236 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 19.
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If respondents are correct that the United States was not in compliance with the
Berne Convention, petitioners argue that section 514 is still not narrowly tailored to
the goal of compliance because it could have burdened “substantially less speech”
Petitioners describe the government’s three
while achieving compliance.237
potentially less-restrictive means in turn: special negotiations, more protection for
reliance parties, or allowing application of the rule of the shorter term or first sale
rights.
First, petitioners argue that the United States could have achieved full
compliance by negotiating the “special conventions” permitted by the Berne
Convention to modify its restoration provisions.238 Under these conventions, the
United States could have negotiated the modification or elimination of restoration
provisions “to accommodate the unique position of the United States relative to any
other Berne Convention signatory” based on the United States Constitution and the
size and scope of the U.S. public domain.239 Respondents, however, doubt the
practicality and success of entering into “extremely arduous” negotiations with “each
of the more than 160 Berne Convention or WTO members.”240 Further, respondents
argue that these negotiations would have conflicted with the government’s interests
in U.S. authors abroad and in the equitable treatment of foreign authors.241
Second, petitioners argue that section 514’s “weak and temporary protection for
reliance parties” was not narrowly tailored to an interest in Berne Convention
compliance.242 The Berne Convention gave parties “broad discretion” to determine
protection for reliance parties, and petitioners explain that “[t]here is nothing in its
text that prohibits reliance interests from being protected completely and
permanently,” or from receiving “permanent freedom to do as they wish with any
copy or recording that was lawfully made prior to section 514.”243 In fact, the district
court on remand had invalidated section 514 because “the government could have
provided complete and permanent protection for reliance parties like petitioners
under the express terms of the Berne Convention.”244 Respondents disagree,
contending that this “full and permanent” protection would not have achieved “actual
and perceived compliance with the Berne Convention,” and that it may have been
challenged in a WTO proceeding.245 This risk was too high, respondents explain, and
the United States has a “substantial interest in avoiding the appearance of an
international-law violation” that could affect its international credibility and status
as a “trusted partner.”246
Third, petitioners contend that the United States could have provided shorter
protection terms or more protection for existing copies of restored works.247 First,
under the Berne Convention’s rule of the shorter term, the United States could have
Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 54.
Id. (citing Berne Convention, supra note 22, art. 18(3)).
239 Id. at 55.
240 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 46.
241 See id.
242 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 59.
243 Id. at 56–58.
244 Id. at 58.
245 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 47–48.
246 Id. at 48.
247 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 59–60.
237
238

[11:83 2011]

Golan v. Holder:
Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment

109

restored protection for foreign works only until their terms expired in their countries
of origin.248 Instead, section 514 restores these works to the full term of U.S.
protection, often “result[ing] in years of unnecessary protection . . . .”249 Additionally,
the Berne Convention would have allowed the United States to protect first sale
rights.250 For over a century, the United States has recognized first sale rights,
“generally permit[ting] the owner of any lawfully made copy to sell or otherwise
dispose of that copy without the permission of the copyright owner.”251 section 514
does not allow first sale rights beyond a one-year grace period, thus burdening rights
more than required for compliance with the Berne Convention.252
Because these arguments were not raised below, respondents ask the Court not
to consider the rule of the shorter term or first sale rights.253 Petitioners argue
against this waiver because they have maintained a consistent argument against
narrow tailoring throughout the litigation, and “in any event” the burden of proving
narrow tailoring is on respondents.254 Respondents further argue that once the Court
establishes Congress’s authority to restore these copyrights, the “appropriate period
of protection is subject only to rational-basis review.”255 They further state that
petitioners’ entire “less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of
the inquiry into the validity of content-neutral regulations on speech.”256
In all, respondents present Berne Comvention compliance as a sufficient
governmental interest to justify section 514’s restriction on speech. Petitioners
disagree, arguing that respondents did not assert enough evidence of harm to make
this a legitimate government interest. Petitioners further point to three lessrestrictive alternatives that the government could have pursued, but respondents
dispute both the alternatives and their relevance.
b. Does the Government’s Interest in Promoting the Rights of United States Authors
Abroad Justify Section 514?
The parties next dispute whether the government’s interest in promoting the
rights of U.S. authors abroad justifies section 514’s restriction on speech. The Tenth
Circuit addressed only this interest on appeal, and found it to be a valid justification
of section 514. Petitioners contend that the United States does not have an
important—or “even a legitimate”—interest in promoting the rights of U.S. authors
abroad.257 In petitioners’ view, Congress “g[ave] away vested public speech rights on
the bare possibility that it might someday create private economic benefits for U.S.
Id. (citing Berne Convention, supra note 22, art. 7(8)).
Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 60.
250 Id.
251 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006)).
252 Id. at 60–61.
253 Resps. Br. supra note 97, at 48 (citing Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 n.3 (1999)).
254 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 19 n.3.
255 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 49 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003)).
256 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 217 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989)).
257 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 49.
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authors.”258 Respondents object to petitioners’ portrayal of this protection as
“windfalls,” instead defining it as “a (belated) opportunity to receive a reasonable
return on their creative investment.”259 In fact, respondents accuse petitioners and
other reliance parties of receiving a “windfall” in their pre-URAA exploitation of
foreign works by Russian composers who were never compensated for these uses
within the United States.260 Respondents assert that the government’s interest in
these authors is part of copyright law’s recognized purpose of “[r]ewarding authors
for their creative labor.”261 Accordingly, section 514 creates economic incentives for
foreign authors, whose works benefit Americans, and for American authors, who
require “effective protections abroad” in “today’s global economy.”262
Petitioners dispute the certainty of any benefit to U.S. authors, arguing that
Congress had only “guesses” and “a general hope that a few foreign nations may one
day provide reciprocal protection . . . .”263 Petitioners contend that this “abstract and
unsubstantiated hope” does not provide the required “substantial evidence” for
Congress’s predictive judgment.264 Respondents, however, contend that Congress
had “clear, substantial evidence” that the foreign restoration of U.S. works was
“directly tied” to the U.S. government’s own restoration of foreign works.265 This
prediction, respondents argue, “proved correct” when Russia restored copyrights for
U.S. authors sometime after section 514 was enacted.266 Petitioner asserts that
respondents can point out “exactly one country (Russia)” and that its reciprocal
restoration “did not happen until 2004.”267 Interestingly enough, this occurred three
years after Golan filed suit,268 and ten years after the URAA’s enactment.269
Respondents further state that this foreign demand for reciprocity included “the
scope and extent” of restored rights.270 Respondents explain that Congress’s
“predictions accord with common sense,” and that “Congress has broad latitude to
make such predictive judgments, particularly in the realm of foreign affairs . . . .”271
Petitioners maintain that “the government . . . does not attempt to explain why it has
any proper interest in giving away public speech rights to create private economic
benefits.”272 Thus, the parties dispute whether section 514 promotes U.S. authors’
rights, and whether any such promotion justifies section 514.

Id. at 49–50.
Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 49.
260 Id. at 50.
261 Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)).
262 Id.
263 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 50.
264 Id. at 51.
265 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 51.
266 Id.
267 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 20–21.
268 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
269 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
270 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 52.
271 Id. at 53.
272 Pets. Reply Br., supra note 98, at 21.
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c. Does the Government’s Interest in Remedying Prior Inequalities of Treatment of
Foreign Authors Justify Section 514?
Lastly, respondents contend that section 514 furthers the government’s
important interest in “remedying prior inequalities of treatment between American
and foreign authors.”273 Certain works had entered the public domain because their
foreign authors did not comply with copyright formalities that did not exist in their
countries, and that Congress later repealed.274 Respondents explain that section 514
“alleviate[s] those prior disparities.”275 Petitioners contend that section 514 instead
“creates inequity where none existed” because U.S. authors who similarly failed to
comply with formalities during this time do not receive restoration under section
514.276 The parties thus disagree on whether the United States has a valid remedial
interest which justifies section 514.
* * *
In their briefs before the Court, the parties differ sharply in their interpretations
of constitutional text, Congressional history and practice, international obligations,
and governmental interests.
They ultimately argue for and against the
constitutionality of section 514 under both the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment.
IV. GOLAN IN THE COURT: AN APPRAISAL OF THE ISSUES
As we have seen, the Court might plausibly consider four issues in Golan.277
Does restoration of copyright in works that have been in the public domain violate
the Copyright Clause? Assuming that to be so as a general proposition, is the specific
restoration of foreign works (as allowed by section 514 of the URAA) permitted
nevertheless? Does the Treaty Power additionally or separately enable Congress to
authorize such restoration? And finally, does the restoration in this case violate the
First Amendment, whether in the particular circumstances occasioned by the URAA
or more generally?
We will comment on the first three issues only briefly, mainly in order to
anticipate our somewhat longer comment on the fourth. What the Court ultimately
may do with any of these issues is an open question as we write, of course, but at
least in our judgment there is no doubt that the role of the First Amendment ought to
be seen as paramount among them. To put the matter bluntly, the Court’s previous
cases have dealt with the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment
in a cavalier and barely coherent fashion. Copyright has been given primacy of place
between them, while the First Amendment has been treated as if it were an
inconvenient subject of merely secondary concern. Golan affords an opportunity to do
a better job of reordering that relationship, against a background of more thoughtful
Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 54.
Id. at 53–54.
275 Id. at 54.
276 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 22.
277 See infra Part IV.C. We are restating and reordering the issues somewhat in this portion of
our essay, but without intending to affect them in substantive terms. As we will explain, the role of
the Treaty Power does not actually appear to be at issue in the case.
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and persuasive reasoning. With others who are following the case closely, we can
hope that the Court will prove itself equal to that challenge.
But first things first.
A. The General Inviolability of the Public Domain
It seems unlikely that Congress can authorize a general restoration of copyright
in works in which protection has vested and then run to its conclusion in due course.
Copyright in the United States has long been thought to presuppose limited terms
followed by permanent repose in the public domain as part of an essential bargain
envisioned by the Framers and reflected in the Copyright Clause. Original works of
authorship are given limited terms of protection in order “to promote the progress of
science,” a phrase in which “science” is taken to mean human knowledge and
understanding, rather than technical know-how.278 Copyright is justified as an
incentive to produce such works; the public domain is the place to which every work
of authorship must eventually be consigned in order to fulfill the terms of the
bargain.279 Congress generally has no power to set aside this bargain under that
Clause.280
To be sure, no case confirms this proposition in quite such unequivocal terms.281
But it has long been an article of faith, one amounting to common ground, among
serious students of copyright. The oral argument in Eldred proceeded against what
appeared to be a general concession to this effect from all quarters, including
members of the Court who found occasion to address the proposition in passing, and
whose comments left no reason to suppose they doubted it.282 Still other recent cases
278 See Sen. Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, To Promote the Progress of Science:
The
Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2002)
(explaining that the notion of “science” during copyright’s founding era generally meant all forms of
learning and knowledge) (citing THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 1789)).
279 See James H. Billington, Copyright, Electronic Works, And Federal Libraries: Maintaining
Equilibrium, FED. LIBR. & INFO. CTR. COMM. (Mar. 10, 1999) available at
http://www.loc.gov/flicc/forum99.html; see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965, 1023 (1990) (noting that the public domain contains “raw material” for the use of other
authors).
280 See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 265-66 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2002).
281 But cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (explaining that “Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available”). Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
Constitution, which was the subject of the Court’s observation in Graham, applies to copyright as
well as patent law. There is no defensible reason to suppose that the public domain is or should be
less secure in copyright than in patent law. Indeed, if there is any difference between them
historically, then, as we will point out presently, the exact opposite is to be expected. See infra notes
333–335 and accompanying text.
282 The question of restoration of works in the public domain after an expired term was not
before the Court in Eldred, but it was addressed briefly and hypothetically during oral argument.
Transcript of Oral Argument, at 21–22, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002) (No.01-0618). The
government sought to leave the question open, but ultimately appeared to concede that there was a
“bright line” between term extensions and restoration from the public domain. Id. at 29–30, 44. The
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have treated the passage of works into the public domain as an all-but-inviolable
assurance of their availability to anyone who may care to make use of them.283
Nothing in Golan is really at odds with a general proposition that works in the public
domain are ordinarily beyond the protection of copyright under a conventional
understanding of the Copyright Clause. We think it likely that the Court will concur
in this essential understanding.
B. Restoration of Public Domain Works under the URAA and the Copyright Clause
It does not necessarily follow from the general inviolability of the public domain
that the “restoration” to copyright protection of works like those covered by section
514 is forbidden by the Copyright Clause. To be sure, such restoration cannot be said
to be included among the powers granted to Congress in any explicit sense. It is
doubtful the Framers themselves would have expected it. There is nothing even
remotely conventional about it: restoration of this sort falls well outside the
“traditional contours” of copyright. And yet Congress surely is not to be seen as
enmeshed forever in the uses of the past, no more so in the context of copyright than
in some other setting altogether. Article I of the Constitution imposes any number of
limits on Congressional action, including limits on the general restoration to
protection of public domain works; but whether the Copyright Clause limits the
action taken in the context of restoration under the URAA remains a more subtle
question.
Restoration in these very particular circumstances might be seen (more or less
as the government has argued) as an essentially procedural step taken to limit the
untoward or inequitable effects of erstwhile formal requirements now judged to have
been unnecessary or unjustified as applied to a limited class of works. Whether that
is so is debatable. But the petitioners are surely right to argue in response that one
historic pattern of legislative unfairness does not justify another one now. The new
Act might have been tailored in a different way, particularly so as to exempt
“reliance parties” from its detrimental strictures. Reliance parties might have been
given the right, for example, to continue to exploit these works in such fashion as
they had already undertaken to do, essentially as the creators of derivative works are

Justices who entertained hypotheticals involving restoration (Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter)
did not suggest that they thought such action would be constitutional. Id. at 38. The petitioners
stated early on that work could not be withdrawn from the public domain after the expiration of an
applicable term, even if the term might be extended while the copyright still subsisted. Id. at 43–48.
The Court’s eventual opinion appeared to reflect this understanding. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 234 (2002) (“The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the
restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose . . . Congress may not authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available.”) (quoting Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
283 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); see also Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (explaining that once a
patentee or copyright holder’s monopoly has expired, the public has the right to use the work at will
without attribution to the original creator).
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given the right to continue the exploitation of their works after the exercise of
termination rights.284
We do not presume to rewrite the Act. Nor do we mean to endorse restoration
even in less objectionable circumstances. We intend merely to acknowledge in
passing the greater resulting plausibility of an argument in support of such
restoration, as against the countervailing weight of the Copyright Clause, were
restoration to be carefully tailored so as to work at least no immediate harm to
persons who had acted in reliance on the public domain. The important point here is
that Congress could have provided for restoration, well within the requirements of
the Berne Convention, without necessarily having substituted one form of inequity
for another. It might well have done so, but it did not clearly do so.
Given the uncertain consequences of restoration as it is actually configured in
the legislation, the result seems plainly at odds with the essential purpose and
function of the public domain.285 As the Court itself has acknowledged in at least two
recent cases, the public domain is meant to enable secure reliance on the availability
of the works residing there for such uses as those who encounter them may choose to
make.286 The petitioners could not sensibly have been expected to suppose otherwise.
They have obviously been harmed by the legislation that figures in this case: the
licensing scheme woven into the URAA legislation does not secure them against the
threat of ruinous expenses and transaction costs.287 In these circumstances

284 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(a)(4)(A) (2006); see also notes 22–32, 236–255 and
accompanying text, which addresses the following observations. As to the essential terms and
conditions of continuing exploitation, proprietors of post-termination derivative works remain in the
position they were in prior to termination. In contrast, proprietors of post-restoration derivative
works arguably must negotiate new license fees or else face litigation in a federal court into whose
judgment the question of a “reasonable” fee is consigned. The effect is to throw reliance parties into
a position of uncertainty as to the viability of continued exploitation of derivative works under the
URAA; see Email from Eric Schwartz, Attorney at Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp L.L.P., and Acting
General Counsel at the U.S. Copyright Office at the time of the drafting of the URAA, to author,
Oct. 3, 2011 (on file with author) (noting that the then-Acting Copyright Register herself drafted the
reliance party exceptions). The exceptions: (a) included the certain and unambiguous right of the
user to continue to exploit the derivative work for the remainder of copyright after restoration,
pursuant to section 104A(d)(3), subject only to (b) a “reasonable” compensation, which might be in
some instances de minimis (i.e., $1). Id.; see Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on
Retroactive United States Copyright Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 157, 241 (discussing the limited requirements of the Berne Convention, and the numerous
ways in which Congress might have secured reliance parties against the adverse effects of
restoration).
285 No party to the case disputes that petitioners will be harmed. The Tenth Circuit accepted it
as a given that some restriction on the petitioners’ rights would follow from the legislative scheme
enacted pursuant to the URAA. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 2010).
286 See, e.g., TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (stating “[t]rade dress protection must subsist with the
recognition that in many instances there is no prohibition against copying goods and products”); see
also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 24 (explaining that Dastar took a creative work that was within the public
domain, copied it, made a few minor changes, and then produced its own set of videotapes based on
the original).
287 See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
The legislation enables restoration
proprietors to demand fees for licenses without any explicit limit on those demands. If agreement is
not reached as to the amount of a disputed fee, then the matter is remitted to the jurisdiction of a
federal court for a decision as to a “reasonable” amount, with litigation likely to follow.
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restoration appears to be deeply and fundamentally at odds with both the purpose of
the public domain and of the Copyright Clause itself.288
C. The Role of the Treaty Power
The petitioners in Golan plainly anticipated reliance by the government on the
Treaty Power conferred on Congress under Article I, and briefed the issue
accordingly.289 As we have said in our summary of the parties’ positions, however,
the government has not addressed the issue at length, and in fact has asked that any
ruling on this issue take place in a lower court.290 We can expect that the Court will
not take up the question either. Though the matter now appears to be less pressing,
we think it still deserves some passing attention in our comments.
Does the Treaty Clause authorize Congress to do what the Copyright Clause
does not? Or to sharpen the question, can Congress rely on its Treaty Power to act
against an affirmative constraint implicit in the Copyright Clause? To this latter
inquiry we think the answer must be, decisively, No.
Again, no case in the Supreme Court has addressed this question directly. In
The Trade-Mark Cases291 in 1879 the Court did reserve its opinion as to whether the
Treaty Power might serve as a source of jurisdiction in enacting trademark
legislation that the Copyright Clause did not support.292 But the Copyright Clause
did not affirmatively forbid trademark legislation; it merely established certain
prerequisites to enactment (namely, originality) that trademark law did not meet.293
Trademark law itself was not seen as conflicting with copyright in any inherent or
fundamental way. Indeed, had the Commerce Clause otherwise been available, the
Court appeared to suppose (without actually deciding) that the two systems of law
(copyright and trademark) might have proceeded on separate jurisdictional
grounds.294
In the event, the Commerce Clause was not available under the restricted
interpretation that governed it in the late nineteenth century. Meanwhile, no treaty
was involved in The Trademark Cases at all. The Court appeared merely to happen
upon the Treaty Clause as it rummaged among the provisions of the Constitution for
other suitable sources of jurisdiction. In the end, then, the Court went no further
than to acknowledge the unexamined possibility of alternative sources of jurisdiction
under multiple clauses in a case involving no direct conflict arising from one clause
as against another. There is nothing at all remarkable in that scenario. Today, the
288 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Innovation, advancement, and things
which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system . . . . This is
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”).
289 Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 62.
290 Supra notes 100–108 and accompanying text.
291 In re The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
292 Id. at 99.
293 Id. at 93–94.
294 See id. at 95 (“The question, therefore, whether the trade-mark bears such a relation to
commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control, when used or applied to the
classes of commerce which fall within that control, is one which, in the present case, we propose to
leave undecided.”).
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Commerce Clause is given an expanded reading that generally accommodates
trademark law, ordinarily without conflicting with the Copyright Clause at all.295
The Treaty Power meanwhile has remained essentially unexamined in this context.
In a case like Golan, however, the circumstances might be thought to present
just such a conflict. As we have seen, the URAA provisions reflected in sections 514
affront the Copyright Clause in a fundamental way by limiting secure reliance on the
public domain. But the Treaty Power does not justify this affront explicitly, and
cannot sensibly be said to do so by implication. As a preliminary matter, we should
remember that general provisions in law ordinarily are not to be given precedence
over more specific limitations. This is as true in constitutional interpretation as it is
in other settings.296 It is especially so when Congress has not been thrust upon the
horns of a dilemma—as it has not been in this case.
Again, the Berne Convention did not oblige Congress to enact the URAA with its
attendant strictures upon the legitimate expectations of reliance parties vis-à-vis the
public domain, and its resulting conflict with the Copyright Clause. No treaty
obligation lurked in the background of this affair. The Berne Convention imposed no
particular obligation to act one way or another. This was entirely a matter of
overreaching and misjudgment on the part of Congress, urged on by the Executive
Branch. It would amount to a notable species of chutzpah to defend it now by
turning to the Treaty Power for authority to do what the Copyright Clause forbids.
In the end there is no greater reason to rely on the Treaty Power in a case like Golan
than there was in The Trademark Cases. In our judgment, the government was quite
correct to make no issue of the matter here.
D. Summing-Up, Ad Interim
Neither the Copyright Clause nor the Treaty Power can sensibly be said to
justify the scheme adopted by Congress for restoring copyright to foreign works that
had previously entered the public domain.
Congress itself has not generally thought it has the power to restore public
domain works to copyright protection. The restoration of foreign works provided for
by the URAA cannot be defended as an exercise in fairness for foreign proprietors,
given the plainly unfair consequences for reliance parties who may now face hardship
and even ruin as the public domain status they counted on is swept away. Whether
generally or in more particular circumstances, Congress cannot strip works in the
public domain of their status in violation of the assurance of availability that status
is meant by the Copyright Clause to secure.

295 In both TrafFix and Dastar, for example, no question was raised as to the general authority
of Congress to enact trademark legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. That authority have
been acknowledged at least since the enactment of The Lanham Act of 1946. See generally, David L.
Lange, The Lanham Act After Fifty Years, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–3 (1996) (prefacing the
historical evolution of trademark law as noted in a symposium by leading authorities on the
subject).
296 See David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 224–29 (1996).
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The Treaty Power does not confer the authority to do what Congress has done in
this case either. No treaty obligation is involved in Golan, and certainly none that
requires or justifies the results envisioned by the URAA. Reliance on the Treaty
Power would have been a red herring, and nothing more.
What remains meanwhile is the question—or, really, the array of questions
occasioned by the role of the First Amendment vis-à-vis copyright. These were the
questions that the Tenth Circuit quite rightly recognized in this setting two years
ago. That Circuit’s ultimate decision in the case was misjudged, or so we think, but
the issues themselves remain alive and well. We turn to them now in the final
portion of our comments.
V. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
How should we understand the relationship between copyright and the First
Amendment? No case before the Court has considered this question in a serious,
measured, contemplative or plenary fashion. Thus the pleadings, lower court
opinions and briefs in Golan to this date all reflect responses that are in their nature
tentative and inadequate, and often at odds with the real nature of the controversy.
We will acknowledge these responses, but in our observations here we will also
advance an understanding of the subject that we think offers a better appreciation of
the absolute primacy of the Amendment in its on-going relationship with
copyright.297
A. Twice-Told Tales298
No one who knows copyright doubts seriously that it abridges expression. Its
very purpose is to abridge some expression in order to encourage other expression, all
according to an elaborate system of exclusive rights and limitations established by
Congress. Copyright may or may not offer important incentives to the expression it
protects. Proponents say it does; skeptics question whether that is so. It does so in
any event, if it does so at all, by abridging expression that it judges inconsistent with

297 Much of the discussion acknowledges and reflects an understanding of the appropriate
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment developed by Professors David Lange and
Jefferson Powell in their recent book, No Law: Intellectual Property in the Image of an Absolute First
Amendment. See DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (Stanford University Press 2009). This work is
extensively researched; we count on our readers to avail themselves of that research. We assume
readers will also understand that Professor Lange is among the co-authors of both the book and this
essay. (Professor Powell, who is currently on leave from the George Washington University School
of Law to serve in a senior position on the staff of the Department of Justice, has played no role in
the development of this essay).
298 The origins of the Court’s current approach to copyright and the First Amendment has been
recounted numerous times. See, e.g., LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 108–46. Much of the
treatment in their work acknowledges and reflects a conventional understanding of the subject,
often amounting to common ground. Their ultimate approach to the subject, however, is
considerably less conventional.
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the incentives, such as they may be. That is the nature of copyright. Judging and
abridging expression are among its central functions.
The government emphatically agrees with us as to this critically important
point:
The Copyright Clause differs from other Article I provisions . . . in that the
very purpose of copyright protection is to limit the manner in which
expressive works may be used. The imposition of some restrictions on
expressive activity is therefore the intended and inherent effect of every
grant of copyright.299
Surely, then, copyright must inevitably contravene the First Amendment in an
important and inescapable way. How could that not be so?
Some forty years ago Professor Melville Nimmer published an essay in which he
himself asked whether, for this very reason, copyright must also therefore violate the
First Amendment.300 A distinguished scholar of both copyright and the First
Amendment, Nimmer seemed superbly suited to the inquiry he proposed. The
Amendment says, among other things, that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging freedom of speech, or of the press.”301 Surely, he reasoned in a
powerful introduction to his essay, a system like copyright must be at odds with the
meaning plainly evident in this language. Taking the language at face value, as he
understood Justice Black would do, Nimmer argued that the Amendment is clearly
inconsistent with the exclusive rights in expression that copyright allows.302 Indeed,
or so one might easily imagine upon still further reflection, the more important the
reasons for granting exclusive rights in expression may be, the more important the
violation of the First Amendment’s absolute proscription also must become.
In fact, however, Nimmer’s introduction was a cunning exercise in devil’s
advocacy. Justice Black’s absolutism (“no law means no law, and no ifs, ands, buts or
whereases”)303 had been dismissed by nearly everyone with a professional interest in
the First Amendment, including every member of the Court except Justice Douglas.
Nimmer himself did not accept the language of the Amendment as an absolute.
Instead, like many other students of the Amendment then and now, he counted
himself a disciple of an approach that sought to determine meaning and primacy by
balancing supposed First Amendment interests against the interests to be served by
abridgement. This approach was not limited to copyright; any effort at abridgement
might be tested in similar fashion. Indeed, “definitional balancing,” as this approach
was then known and practiced, was simply a descendant of a more general approach
to interpreting the constitution at large that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had
advocated years before.304 Among lawyers, legal scholars and judges, constitutional

Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 34 (emphasis in original).
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaranties of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1181 (1970); see generally LANGE & POWELL, supra note
297, at 134–38.
301 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
302 See Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1181–83.
303 Id. at 1811 (quoting Justice Black); see LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 239–60.
304 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 225–238.
299
300
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absolutes are generally frowned upon in conceptual terms and routinely disfavored in
practice.305
Nimmer considered himself free, then, to answer his original question by
concluding, on balance, that copyright did not ordinarily violate the First
Amendment. Some instances of copyrightable expression might be sufficiently
impressed with public significance to justify First Amendment protection against
exclusivity: news of the My Lai massacre, then still a relatively fresh matter of
public interest and concern, would have qualified in his opinion, as would some other
subjects.306 But generally it was copyright that would prevail, thanks to doctrinal
“safeguards” (as they have come to be called) that served to offset First Amendment
concerns.
In particular, he thought, copyright’s so-called “idea/expression
dichotomy”—according to which ideas themselves are never copyrightable—meant
that exclusive rights in expression could be tolerated.307 It is also probable that
Nimmer would have counted the fair use doctrine as a safeguard, though in fact his
discussion of that doctrine was actually somewhat ambivalent as to that point.308
Nimmer’s general conclusion as to copyright’s primacy has survived, augmented
by two decisions in the Supreme Court that have actually appeared to strengthen
copyright’s considerable immunity to First Amendment scrutiny. In Harper & Row
v. The Nation Magazine,309 decided in 1985, the Court considered a case in which the
defendants (a minor journal of political commentary and its publisher) had purloined
and published excerpts from a copyrighted biography of former President Gerald
Ford which was scheduled to be published later by Harper & Row, accompanied by
exclusive excerpts to appear in Time Magazine. Harper & Row claimed damages for
copyright violation, while The Nation argued that the First Amendment privileged
the publication—as indeed Nimmer himself might imaginably have argued in the
circumstances.310
But Justice O’Connor and the majority rejected the First Amendment defense to
the copyright claim.311 In her opinion she embraced Nimmer’s reasoning as to
copyright’s doctrinal safeguards,312 but did not credit the defendant’s argument as to
the importance of the public interest. Indeed, in the circumstances, which had
involved unauthorized publication of the excerpt prior to the authorized release of the
book-length biography, O’Connor thought that neither fair use nor the First
Amendment provided a defense. In her opinion for the Court, she offered an
additional historic gloss on the Framers’ understanding of the relationship between
copyright and the Amendment that Nimmer had not suggested. “The Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression,” she wrote. “By

305 See generally id. at 263–83 (discussing “[c]onstitutional [a]bsolutes in a Holmesian [w]orld”
and historical viewpoints of absolute rights).
306 See Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1197–99.
307 See id. at 1189–93.
308 See id. at 1190–91; but cf. LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 137 n.104 (noting that “a
close reading” of Nimmer’s fair use analysis “can leave the reader in some doubt as to the
relationship he saw between [the fair use] doctrine and the First Amendment”).
309 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
310 Id. at 543–44; see, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1181.
311 Harper, 471 U.S. at 560.
312 See id. at 556.
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establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”313
This is dubious history at best.314 In the first place it is unlikely that the
Framers intended anything more from the First Amendment than that it would
constrain Congress against abridging freedom of speech and press, just as it said in
so many words. Contemporary theory, invented entirely in the twentieth century,
does sometimes envision more for the Amendment;315 what the framers may have
anticipated remains fair game for debate.316 It is unlikely that they intended
copyright to be the “engine of free expression,” if by that phrase one means to link
copyright with affirmative goals supposedly implicit in the First Amendment. They
were obviously not thinking of the First Amendment at all when they included the
Copyright Clause in the original draft of the Constitution. Meanwhile, it is likely that
they were not thinking clearly about copyright either. As every student of the subject
knows, the Copyright Clause was adopted without any record of debate.317 That the
Framers may have expected something of copyright is plausible enough, but what
that something may have been is anything but clear, and may well not have been the
same thing from one Framer to the next. That they imagined in 1787 that copyright
would be the device by which they would secure what twentieth century citizens
might one day hope for from a First Amendment not to be considered or adopted until
1791 is altogether improbable.318
Still, O’Connor’s fanciful metaphor in Harper & Row was of a piece with history
in the Supreme Court of the United States, and was so nicely wrought meanwhile as
to be all but irresistible. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,319 a 2003 decision, Justice Ginsburg
dutifully quoted the passage above from Harper & Row in the course of endorsing,
yet again, that earlier decision’s adoption of Nimmer’s rationale. “In addition to
spurring the creation and publication of new expression,” Ginsburg intoned,
Id. at 558.
We mean to convey both of the implications in this sentence. It is at best dubious history; it
would do no injustice to O’Connor’s proposition to dismiss it as outright bogus. But it is also a
splendid example of the genre, in which Justices allow each other considerable latitude with the
truth about the past in exchange for adaptable analogies, muscular metaphors, soaring flights of
fancy and other forensic utilities of like kind.
315 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 171–72:
[N]o part of the Constitution has grown more dramatically or played a greater role
in defining the American experience than has the First Amendment. In the
decades since . . . the Supreme Court’s first important decision touching upon the
meaning of the First Amendment . . . [in 1919,] the value of the First Amendment
has grown by measures that are beyond our ability to account for here. Perhaps
no complete assessment of the First Amendment’s place in American life is
possible. Certainly it seems likely that for most Americans the cultural value of
the First Amendment exceeds by severalfold the value assigned to the interests
protected by intellectual property. From a cultural perspective it is entirely
plausible to suggest that First Amendment interests are beyond price.
Id.
316 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 126–27, 127 n.74.
We are inclined to think
Zechariah Chafee summed up that debate most persuasively when he suggested that the Framers
“had no very clear idea what they meant.”
317 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 277, at 2.
318 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 124–27. This passage especially embraces the
position taken by Professors Lange and Powell in their book.
319 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186 (2003).
313
314
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“copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations. First, it
distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for
copyright protection . . . . Second, the ‘fair use’ defense allows the public to use not
only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in
certain circumstances.”320 This was dutiful enough, but neither new nor particularly
thoughtful in itself, since what Ginsburg had to say about this much of the subject
amounted to little more than an echo of what had been said before.
Yet Ginsburg’s opinion in Eldred was destined to be something more than
merely derivative. The petitioners in Eldred had asked the Court to weigh the
purposes and burdens imposed by the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
(“CTEA”) against the constraints imposed by the First Amendment in the light of
“heightened scrutiny” —this according to a hierarchy of balances that had long since
supplanted the definitional balancing that Nimmer knew. More specifically, the
petitioners had argued that extending the terms of existing copyrights, as the CTEA
would do, amounted to a content-neutral regulation of speech.321 Professors David
Lange and Jefferson Powell have recently discussed “heightened scrutiny” in their
book length treatment of copyright and the First Amendment:
Contemporary First Amendment doctrine distinguishes regulations of
expression in which the burden on expression is related to its content from
regulations in which the burden on expression is unrelated to content. The
former “content-based” regulations are, the Supreme Court has said
repeatedly, “presumptively invalid”: in reviewing them a court must use
“the most exacting scrutiny” to ensure that it upholds only those regulations
that are “narrowly tailored” in order to serve a compelling governmental
interest.
In contrast, “content-neutral” regulations that impose “an
incidental burden” on expression are reviewed for their compatibility with
the First Amendment under what the Court has termed “an intermediate
level of scrutiny”: in this case the regulation is valid if “it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”322
On the face of the matter, heightened scrutiny might have seemed especially
justified as against the decision below in Eldred, in which the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia had concluded that copyright was “categorically immune
from challenges under the First Amendment.”323 Such a conclusion might have
suggested the risks inherent in according copyright a primacy vis-à-vis the First
Amendment that no other system of law can claim. Yet Ginsburg’s response was
merely to “reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a
copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
safeguards. ‘The copyright Clause and the First Amendment were adopted close in
Id. at 219–20.
Id. at 218.
322 LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 116–17.
323 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
320
321
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time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s monopolies are
compatible with free speech principles.’”324
To this rejection, which seemed clumsily reasoned but might imaginably have
been reconciled with prior case law, including Harper & Row, Ginsburg offered an
additional response that had no provenance at all in any decision that had gone
before. “We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly [in suggesting
categorical immunity],” she allowed; but “when, as in this case, Congress has not
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment
scrutiny is unnecessary.”325
One might suspect that this was essentially a throw-away line, intended to do
little more than deflect serious criticism of her notably thin opinion on the First
Amendment questions while deferring serious contemplation of the answers.
However it may have been intended, a different result was bound to follow. No one
encountering Ginsburg’s reference to “traditional contours” could fail to wonder
where the line implicit in that phrase might fall. For those to whom the Court’s illjudged opinions on copyright and the First Amendment were anathema, if not an
invitation to outright contempt, even a faint-hearted suggestion that at some point
copyright might yield to concerns for a larger freedom of expression was bound to
pose an occasion for a quest.
B. Traditional Contours of Copyright
What are we to understand the “traditional contours” of copyright to be? What
does it mean when we speak of these contours in the context of the First
Amendment? And why should it matter?
The answer is that it ought to matter enormously if we think the First
Amendment means even approximately what it seems to say. Whatever the
traditional configurations of copyright may be, they are surely relevant to the more
important question of copyright’s potential for conflict with freedom of expression.
Professor Nimmer was correct to approach this question as he did in the opening
paragraphs of his seminal article on the subject. He was also right to conclude that
copyright’s traditional contours, taken at face value, appear to violate the First
Amendment, also taken at face value.
He was wrong, however, to conclude that copyright doctrines could serve as a
substitute for the explicit constraints in the First Amendment. The doctrinal
safeguards are presumably close to the center of whatever Justice Ginsburg may
have meant when she spoke in passing of copyright’s “traditional contours.” But
copyright’s doctrines and contours define the nature of their conflict with the First
Amendment, not an excuse for wishing it away.
That conflict results mainly from the exclusivity that copyright today generally
presupposes, an exclusivity of the sort that figures in Golan, as it does in virtually
every doctrinal aspect of copyright at large.326 The conflict is not lessened by the fact

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2002).
Id. at 221.
326 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 175.
324
325
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that copyright’s exclusivity is not total or absolute. The idea-expression dichotomy
and the fair use doctrine may ameliorate the conflict to a degree. They do not
eliminate it. They cannot justify it. They furnish no excuse for ignoring it. Nimmer
was wrong to think so. And so has been the Court which, in following Nimmer’s lead,
can be pardoned only on the ground that its inquiry into the matter to date has been
so cursory as to amount to no inquiry at all.327
And yet sometimes we can be grateful even for half measures. If copyright is
immune to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment only for so long as it
falls within its traditional contours, then we can take some satisfaction in agreeing
with the Tenth Circuit that the URAA’s withdrawal of millions of foreign works from
the public domain, and their “restoration” to protection under American copyright
law, are anything but traditional.328 They are in fact unprecedented, and that is so
even if one sees the very rare, very different and very limited restoration of works
during wartime as analogous.329 Analogous these wartime actions may be, perhaps,
in some very distant sense, but they were anything but traditional. Precedents for
the URAA they are not.
Meanwhile, the government and a handful of amici before the Court in Golan
have argued in effect that the first copyright act in 1790 “restored” public domain
works to protection under the first federal copyright act.330 What they mean is that
some works long since published under prevailing colonial law suddenly became
eligible for new federal protection. But this argument simply misunderstands the
nature of the newly created Constitutional version of the public domain, and its role
as a function of the Copyright Clause. In this new relationship, the one begat the
other.331 There was no restoration; there was merely a beginning. As an original
matter, informed by the First Amendment nunc pro tunc, we might well argue that
this beginning was also the beginning of a conflict with freedom of expression. And

Id.

In the evolution of the First Amendment to date, multiple theories addressing
and defining freedom of expression have been advanced by scholars and courts
alike . . . . It is enough for the moment to note that at the center of them all is a
common concern for the question of freedom from suppression, a concern aimed
at realizing the well-being that follows when citizens are free not only to ‘think
as they will’ but also to ‘speak as they think.’ Our contention here is that the
exclusivity commonly recognized and protected among the principal intellectual
property doctrines [with particular emphasis upon copyright] is antithetical to
the realization of that freedom.

327 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 91–97. If the Court itself labored under the socalled “doctrinal safeguards” afforded by copyright, opinion writing would be transformed, and
might well grind to a halt. Id. Ideas and holdings could still be transmitted from one case to the
next, of course, but the customary free appropriation of language and patterns of expression from
earlier cases would have to cease while Justices and their clerks searched for “original” ways to
express ideas. Id. Fair use might help from time to time, in theory; in practice the Justices would
soon think otherwise. The lesson they would learn is clear. In the supple interplay among ideas
and expression, the one simply cannot reliably be made to serve in place of the other. And this is so
whether the substitution is full- or part-time.
328 We think the Tenth Circuit’s holding on this point was correct. See supra notes 47–56 and
accompanying text.
329 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
330 Resps. Br., supra note 97, at 11.
331 See Pets. Br., supra note 96, at 31.
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we would certainly insist that in a larger sense the public domain existed, as it still
exists, before and beyond the fact of the Copyright Clause itself.332 But incorporating
pre-1787 works into the realm of copyright was in no sense a violation of its
“traditional contours.” These were only beginning to subsist. They had yet to be
defined.
The government also cites examples of patent restoration in its brief, and in
doing so underscores the essential problem in the way it sees copyright and the First
Amendment. Patent law and copyright are discrete doctrinal systems. Patent law
ordinarily does not abridge expression, and therefore has nothing to do with the First
Amendment. Copyright, in contrast, is “intentionally and inherently” speech
suppressive with respect to “every grant of copyright”—exactly as the government
itself proclaims.333
Patent restoration thus does not speak to the issue of “traditional contours” or
“doctrinal safeguards” in copyright. Why, then, does the government imagine that
the patent cases can serve as precedents in Golan? The answer is that in the
government’s implicit understanding of the Constitution the Copyright (or Patent)
Clause actually stands higher than the First Amendment. And so, in evaluating
Congressional action under the Copyright Clause the Court is advised repeatedly and
insistently by the government to “defer” to the legislative will.334 But of course that
cannot be sound advice. Were it not for the arguments advanced by Nimmer and
artlessly embraced by the Court in Harper & Row and Eldred, the constitutional role
reversal envisioned by the government would seem obviously flawed to any
thoughtful student of the constitution. Even Nimmer understood clearly that it is
the Copyright Clause (and therefore copyright itself) that must be reconciled with the
First Amendment, not the other way around. Copyright is said to contain “doctrinal
safeguards” that enable us to see that reconciliation, but only for so long as copyright
remains within its “traditional contours.” Patent law has nothing to contribute in
this context. The patent restoration cases are all simply, utterly and embarrassingly
beside the point.335
We have previously described the Tenth Circuit’s approach to the question of
traditional contours.336 Its preliminary analysis on this point seems to us to be
332

(2003).

See David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 475, 483

Resps. Brief supra note 97, at 34.
Id. The Court reasoned that:
The imposition of some restrictions on expressive activity is . . . the intended and
inherent effect of every grant of copyright. If the existence of these restrictions
were treated as a ground for heightened judicial scrutiny under the First
Amendment, the principle of deference to Copyright Clause legislation would
effectively be negated.
Id. (emphasis in original).
335 The patent restoration cases are inapposite for an additional reason. All of these cases are
early decisions from the nineteenth century, when the constitutional significance of the public
domain in patent law was still evolving, and at the time were still notably lagging behind copyright.
Today, these cases are all seriously undercut by the later decisions in Graham v. John Deere, 383
U.S. 1 (1966), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989), which have considerably harmonized patent law with copyright insofar as the public domain
is concerned.
336 See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
333
334
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unassailable. Restoration under the URAA cannot be said to be traditional in any
sensible meaning of that term. This was the Tenth Circuit’s own conclusion, one
expressly occasioned by Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Eldred. And so it appeared
that the scenario she envisioned now lay at hand. First Amendment scrutiny of at
least this much of copyright could no longer be avoided.
C. Copyright, Heightened Scrutiny, and the Question of Content Neutrality
As we have also previously explained, heightened scrutiny comes in two forms.
Laws that seek to abridge expression in an immediate, direct or otherwise
inescapable sense are presumptively invalid. Laws that abridge expression only
indirectly, without evident concern for content qua content, are invalid if the law is
insufficiently related to its objective, or if it appears excessive or irrational.337 The
latter is still a form of heightened scrutiny, so it is said, but heightened just enough
that a judge or panel of judges must review the limitation on expression. In the end,
thanks to a striking form of path dependency insured by the principles of judicial
deference and stare decisis, Congressional judgment ordinarily prevails. Heightened
scrutiny of the lesser sort is not altogether an arid exercise, but it is often largely so.
Its typical function is to provide a masque, from behind which a court can conceal or
rationalize the fact that, once again, Congress has abridged expression. In this
conventional usage it is not merely Congress that is abridging expression but also the
courts, and ultimately the Court.338
It would seem to follow that lawyers for clients like the petitioners in Golan
would inevitably insist that the URAA is content-based unless that argument is
somehow expressly precluded by precedent. To succeed on that ground would bring
their clients close to victory, a fortiori. No precedent expressly precluded that
argument in Golan; at most it might have seemed debatable. Yet, as we have said,
all the parties conceded that the restoration provisions were merely content-neutral.
The District Court judge might have overridden this concession, but did not do so; the
Tenth Circuit followed suit on this point.339
That concession almost certainly undercut the petitioners’ case. As we have
explained, the District Court did find that the legislation was impermissibly broad
under even the lesser standard of review. But the Tenth Circuit panel concluded
that Congress had acted rationally, within the limits of its authority to abridge
expression. In our judgment the District Court was correct, for reasons implicit in a
337 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 118–22; Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512
U.S. 622 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997). The Turner I and
Turner II cases appear to have dominated the thinking of both the petitioners and the government,
as is evidenced in their briefs before the Court, though not ultimately to the same end. In our own
assessment, the Turner I and Turner II cases and the “content neutrality” cases are inapposite for
reasons we develop more fully in the text.
338 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 143–44.
339 See supra notes 57, 79 and accompanying text. In the Supreme Court the parties are bound
by their earlier positions. One amicus brief does argue that the URAA is content-based. See Brief of
Info. Soc’y Project at Yale Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 101, at 3. In
our judgment, the position urged in the amicus brief is correct on this point for reasons we elaborate
in our own comments in the text.
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legislative scheme that was seriously flawed, in no small part through overreaching
and overbreadth. The Tenth Circuit panel’s opinion was hardly unforeseeable,
however. Intermediate scrutiny shifts the balance in any case decidedly in favor of
Congressional judgment and the status quo.
Are the restoration provisions of the URAA “content-neutral?” No. The URAA
is an artifact of copyright at large in the supposed service of professional authorship.
Copyright has never been an “engine of free expression.” In today’s world it is the de
facto engine of professional authorship. Authorship itself is the antithesis of content
neutrality. Copyright is no less so. Like authorship at large copyright is “contentbased” to the very core of its being.
The practice of authorship is content-based in the same sense that the practice
of journalism is content-based. No one would imagine that Congress could simply
enact a law silencing, limiting or licensing American journalists in order to encourage
increased coverage of the day’s events by reporters working for Agence France Presse
or Al Jazeera or the British Broadcasting Corporation. At the very least, heightened
scrutiny of the most exacting sort would follow. No Article of the Constitution could
shield such legislation. No argument on behalf of a more enlightened public would
suffice. No claim of entitlement grounded in some jumped-up notion of “content
neutrality” as to any given news story could result in “deference” to “Congressional
discretion.” On the contrary, a deliberate attempt by Congress to limit the practice of
American journalism in order to manipulate public opinion in the service of global
commerce would be seen as all the more offensive to the First Amendment as the
legislative provisions became more comprehensive, more unyielding, more
undiscriminating or more remote.
And yet the professional practices of journalists and authors are in most
important respects fundamentally the same. What is different in their respective
situations is that journalists are embedded in a profession that has been protected
historically against Congressional licensing and oversight. Theory notwithstanding,
the actual practice of journalism has never been subjected to the strictures of
copyright in any important way.340 Authors, on the other hand, are professionally
enmeshed in a complex web of laws and regulations in which licensing and oversight
are increasingly omnipresent. These laws and regulations are no less content-based
for the fact that they are generally sweeping and intrusive.
As the government itself concedes, the copyright regime is in fact an engine for
evaluating the worthiness or unworthiness of individual authorial works and
licensing those works accordingly. A copyrightable work must be capable of being
weighed and found deserving according to principles of creativity, originality, and
exclusivity established and maintained by Congress.341 For every work that receives
protection, myriad works are rejected as correspondingly unworthy. The copyright
system, its programs and its principles, may have no particular interest in one
example of expression as against another from one moment to the next; but it is quite
wrong to imagine that copyright is “content-neutral.”
Against this background one must wonder why the petitioners in Golan yielded
so much as an inch of ground on the question of content neutrality. Perhaps the
See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 72–73.
17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362
(1991) (noting that copyrightable expression must have a “modicum of creativity”).
340
341
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concession was driven by a straitened understanding of the case law—in which event
we would dissent from that reading of the cases.342 Whatever the reason may have
been, no doubt it was professionally defensible and well-intentioned. Yet if
heightened scrutiny meant anything of consequence at all, the consequences of this
concession were not unlikely to be adverse, as indeed they appear to have been to this
point in the progress of the case.
We have detailed the evolution of those consequences in the District Court and
in the Tenth Circuit. Having lost in the Tenth Circuit on the ground of heightened
scrutiny, the petitioners have briefed the point yet again with admirable clarity and
force; having elected to fight on this ground, they have at least given no quarter. The
government’s response is to argue that judicial deference must be paid to any scheme
that Congress has bestirred itself sufficiently to ratify, and this is so whether the
question of sufficiency is addressed in the context of the Copyright Clause or the
First Amendment.343 Our own judgment, meanwhile, is in accord with the District
Court’s conclusion that the scheme enacted by Congress in the URAA goes well
beyond what might be defended under even the lesser form of heightened scrutiny.
In the end, the function of intermediate scrutiny in Golan has been to enable three
judges of the Tenth Circuit to excuse what all the parties concede to be a
Congressional exercise in abridging expression. That is the blunt and inescapable
truth of the matter. As such, it is an affront to the First Amendment, the public
domain, the Copyright Clause, and copyright itself, all of which deserve better.
But “better” does not require a zero sum game. The risk in finding that a law or
regulation is content-based under the existing approach to heightened scrutiny is
that a sensible legislative scheme may fail entirely when a relatively modest
alternative or compromise might suffice to satisfy the First Amendment’s
constraints. This is especially true when the context is copyright, where the present
concept of exclusivity should be seen as anathema to freedom of expression, but
where it is possible to imagine alternatives that do not offend, alternatives that
Congress and the Court, like Nimmer himself, have failed to see.

342 A considerable literature has appeared on the subject of content-based versus contentneutral regulations in the context of copyright and the First Amendment. Opinions tend to be
closely reasoned and sharply divided. Compare, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
697, 703–17 (2003) (discussing why copyright law is a form of speech restriction, but whether or not
copyright law is content-based simply on the grounds that it keeps people from publishing,
producing, and performing the speech that they want to publish, produce, and perform, the fair use
exception to copyright law, would make the laws content-based); with Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001) (discussing
why in First Amendment terms, copyright law is a type of content-neutral speech regulation that
should be subject to rigorous "intermediate scrutiny). Author’s note: we are indebted to Professor
Lange’s former research assistant, Sandra Newmeier, Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2011, for
an excellent memorandum collecting and summarizing this literature. We do not intend to join in
this debate in a plenary way. In our view those who see copyright as predominantly content-based
have the better of the argument.
343 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
As suggested, the epistemology of the
government’s argument is one in which the First Amendment is inevitably subordinated to the
Copyright Clause.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES AND COMPROMISE
A. Copyright in the Image of the First Amendment
Professors Lange and Powell have proposed that, as between copyright and the
First Amendment, the latter must be seen as paramount and absolute.344 In this
embrace of First Amendment primacy, they are frankly influenced by a larger
understanding of the Amendment most closely identified with Justices Black and
Douglas—an understanding, as we have earlier said, that Professor Nimmer himself
considered in the opening paragraphs of his seminal 1970 essay in which he posed
the question: Does copyright violate the First Amendment?345
Though he did not quite say so, there is little reason to doubt that his ultimate
search for an alternative understanding of the relationship between copyright and
the First Amendment proceeded in some part from what he otherwise imagined
would be copyright’s inevitable demise. His alternative understanding, as we have
also said, lay in copyright’s so-called doctrinal safeguards, set off against the First
Amendment’s “definitional balancing” that preceded today’s “heightened scrutiny.”
His endorsement of this understanding has led to a vast outpouring of writing about
copyright and the First Amendment, and meanwhile to so much of what the Court
has said about these issues in Harper & Row and Eldred, the two cases in which the
Court has given them passing attention. None of this writing has appeared to depart
from the fundamental assumption that copyright and the First Amendment must be
reconciled in order to insure that copyright survives intact.346
In their book, Lange and Powell concur in Nimmer’s initial reasoning as to the
troubled relationship between copyright and an absolute First Amendment. They
entertain no assumption, however, as to the continuing necessity of “saving”
copyright from the consequences of whatever conflict cannot be avoided. In their
view copyright must yield where necessary to the greater constitutional weight of the
Amendment. This is especially so with respect to copyright’s traditional reliance on
Congressional power to grant monopolies in expression. Lange and Powell write:
We propose . . . that the First Amendment be read absolutely, in keeping
with its first and most obvious meaning: that Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of speech or of the press by conferring monopolies in
expression that otherwise would belong to the universe of discourses in which
all are free to share and share alike. In at least this sense, “no law” should
mean no law.347

See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 305.
See Nimmer, supra note 300, at 1180.
346 See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 138–42 (summarizing this literature briefly); NEIL
WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (Oxford Press 2010) (reconciling the treatment of the
subject).
347 LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 305 (emphasis in original).
344
345
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Would this lead to the demise of copyright as Nimmer and others have seemed
to fear? In their response to this question, Lange and Powell observe that in large
measure copyright would continue unchanged:
The subject matter of the doctrines, the reasons for recognizing them, the
disposition of the underlying interests, the incentives and rewards, the
acknowledgment of creativity itself – all of these and more remain
essentially the same . . . .
What [would] change most dramatically is the single thing that makes
[copyright] obviously objectionable under the Constitution at present.
Congress [would] simply have no power to create or recognize monopolies in
expression that otherwise would press itself upon the public consciousness
at large, and this is so whether the monopolies are justified under
the . . . copyright clause, the commerce clause, the treaty power, or
otherwise. When exclusive interests in expression are conferred for no
better reason than that exclusivity [would] encourage the production of such
interests, or make them valuable in the hands of a favored few, the First
Amendment [would] then intervene . . . . Interests in expression [would] no
longer be consigned exclusively to proprietors recognized by the state.348
Recognizing an absolute First Amendment primacy in Golan would change the
nature of the argument and point the way to an outcome considerably less
destructive to the interests of the parties on both sides. To begin with, of course, it
would mean abandoning the tedious and arid debate over content neutrality and its
consequences. No one can deny that the URAA is speech suppressive: it is
legislation indisputably aimed at recognizing and “restoring” exclusive rights in an
array of works once consigned to the public domain. This it proposes to do by
limiting or licensing the expressive interests of parties who otherwise would rely on
the public domain. This much of the legislation Congress could have no power to
enact against the reach of an absolute First Amendment.
But it does not follow that Congress could not generally provide for an allocation
of net revenues according to the value of a copyrighted work in the production of
those revenues. Professor Jed Rubenfeld proposed just such an approach to revenue
sharing in a seminal article early in the last decade.349 Presupposing an entitlement
to appropriate and make use of a copyrighted work, he argued that such revenues
could be apportioned and allocated to the copyright proprietor.350 A priori rents, he
emphasized, were not to be confused with net revenues: the former amount to an
impermissible impediment to appropriation, and therefore are anathema to freedom
of expression; the latter are merely an equitable measure for sharing in the profitable
exploitation of a work meanwhile otherwise freely available to all.351 Rubenfeld
advanced his proposal in the context of a limited concern for what he called “freedom
Id. at 306–07.
See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1, 57–58 (2002).
350 Id. at 57.
351 Id. at 53–54.
348
349
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of imagination,” but there is no reason why the proposal cannot have wider
application. Taking their lead from Rubenfeld, Lange and Powell have proposed the
availability and allocation of net revenues as one way to deal with the continuing
issue of incentives in a copyright regime that no longer recognizes exclusive interests
in expression itself.352
In Golan, then, a straightforward recognition of an absolute First Amendment
would require an equally straightforward recognition by Congress that restoration
under the URAA can be defended against the interests protected by the Amendment
only to the extent that exclusive rights in expression are eliminated. The provisions
with respect to reliance parties would have to be changed or clarified so that, at most,
post-restoration license fees did not exceed net revenues. That could be accomplished
rather easily, however, and in itself would affront neither the Copyright Clause nor
the demands of the Berne Convention. Whether restoration of a work from the public
domain is separately inconsistent with the Copyright Clause would remain an issue
to be resolved. But that resolution would follow along lines no longer burdened in
one significant respect: no one acting, or merely contemplating action, in reliance on
the public domain would be threatened by the prospect of licensing fees due and
payable at the outset of an appropriation.
Meanwhile, presumably, no continuing exclusivity within the “traditional
contours” of copyright could long be sustained against other, more sweeping
challenges to copyright sure to follow. Is Golan the occasion for the adoption of a
change in direction for the First Amendment as profound as that? We think it is.
For the first time in history, copyright legislation has been challenged and haled
before the Court directly and primarily on First Amendment grounds. It is within
the Court’s gift under the Constitution to uphold that challenge. To recognize the
primacy of the First Amendment in the context of copyright is merely to reverse an
error with a provenance of no great length, and a pedigree no more significant than
the opinions in two half-hearted cases.
B. A Compromise in the Service of Expression
Finally, is it plausible to imagine that the Court may find room in the URAA
legislation to escape the constitutional conflicts that appear inherent there, while
saving the public domain and the First Amendment from the most immediate
ravages wrought by that legislation? Again, we think it is.
As we have noted, the legislation presupposes licenses resulting from
negotiations between the proprietors of newly restored copyright in erstwhile public
domain works and reliance parties who may wish to continue using them.353 In the
event of a failure to come to terms, the decision as to the fee is consigned to a federal
court.354 It is clear that the drafters of the legislation imagined that a “reasonable”
See LANGE & POWELL, supra note 297, at 179–82, 181 n.47.
See Copyright Restoration of Works In Accordance with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act;
List Identifying Copyrights Restored Under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act for Which Notices of
Intent to Enforce Restored Copyrights were Filed in the Copyright Office, 63 FED. REG. 43829, 43830
(Aug 14, 1998).
354 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A(e)(1)(C), 111(a)(3) (2006).
352
353
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fee would be imposed as to new and continuing uses; but the amount of that fee is
unspecified. With respect to reliance parties whose continuing uses generate little or
no revenue it is possible that no more than a token fee need be paid. The legislation
does not say so explicitly, but reason to entertain that proposition can be inferred
from a personal account of the negotiations that led to it.355 Meanwhile, given the
lack of specificity in the language of the Act, it would seem that a “reasonable” fee for
even a new use unlikely to produce net revenue would not necessarily require
payment in advance.
There is ample precedent among the Court’s intellectual property opinions for
limiting or withholding a remedy when an act does not clearly provide for one, and
when fairness meanwhile suggests strongly that the remedy should be modified
accordingly.356 On the strength of these opinions a lower court might justifiably
conclude that a fee ought to be limited at most to a stream of net revenues, rather
than from first dollar or still earlier.
A compromise along these lines is not unthinkable in the circumstances
presented in Golan. We ourselves would favor something closer to a bright line
defense against affronts to the public domain, lest it die the death of a thousand cuts.
But at least a compromise could be fashioned that would not violate the First
Amendment in a primary sense. It might lead to still more useful reflections on the
importance of that Amendment in a world increasingly dominated by a system for
licensing creative expression.
VII. CONCLUSION
Golan offers the Court an opportunity to revisit an array of issues in a single
case. The Copyright Clause, the public domain, the Treaty Power, the First
Amendment—no single case has ever presented issues quite as sweeping or as vital
355 Golan v. Holder: Does Restoring Copyright in Foreign Works Violate the First Amendment?,
WASH.
UNIV.
(Jan.
2010),
available
at
GEO.
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/FocusAreas/IP/Pages/Podcasts.aspx.
In January, 2010,
Professor Robert Brauneis convened a pannel discussion at the George Washington University
School of Law to consider the issues then pending in Golan. In the course of that discussion,
Professor Lange and Eric Schwartz engaged in the following exchange:

David Lange: ‘Do I understand you to say that your own sense of what the
negotiations led to, and their reflection in the subsequent legislation, means that
if the reliance party really doesn’t have any revenue, then no reasonable royalty
need be paid at all?’
Eric Schwartz: ‘’Alas, the person who drafted this provision, Barbara Ringer, died
last April. But . . . as I recall, when the notion of reliance part[ies]
surfaced . . . she was arguing for kind of a balance between the author’s rights
with their restored protection . . . and that yes, [as to] reasonable compensation, it
could be in some instances that the rightsholder would acknowledge that, as
against everyone else, they were restored to protection on January 1, [1996], but
as against this derivative works reliance party they may or may not . . . be able to
get anything more than token compensation, and that should be sufficient.’
356 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 224 (1990); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 520 n.18 (2001).

[11:83 2011]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

132

to copyright and freedom of expression as this case does. The Court’s decision could
redirect the course of creative expression before the law. This is an opportunity that
has arrived not a moment too soon.

